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Patrick J. Glen*

INTERRING THE IMMIGRATION
RULE OF LENITY
ABSTRACT
The immigration rule of lenity has haunted immigration jurisprudence since its initial iteration in 1947. But as with any spectral entity,
its existence is more ephemeral than real. The rule was meant to be a
tiebreaker of sorts: a canon that where a provision of the immigration
laws was ambiguous, the courts should impose the more lenient construction. It has never, however, been the dispositive basis for a holding
of the Supreme Court. Rather, to the extent it has been referenced, it
has been trotted out only as a rhetorical device to sanction a decision
reached on other grounds. Even this rhetorical role has been called into
question with the advent of Chevron deference. The raison d’être of the
rule was to provide the basis of decision when the court was confronted
with two equally plausible interpretations of a statutory provision.
Chevron now fills that gap, and there seems no room left for the immigration rule of lenity in modern administrative law. Rather than continue to allow this outmoded rule of decision to stalk argumentation in
immigration cases, the Supreme Court should simply euthanize and
inter the rule at the earliest opportunity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Reviewing briefs filed before the Supreme Court in immigration
cases over the past decade, one could be forgiven for believing that the
so-called “immigration rule of lenity” is a vibrant and integral component of the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation. It has been
raised to argue, inter alia, that a second controlled-substance possession conviction may be a “drug trafficking crime” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) only where the prosecutor has sought
and obtained a recidivist enhancement;1 that tax crimes are categorically excluded from the INA’s provision relating to criminal offenses
involving fraud or deceit;2 that a state statute must contain a jurisdictional element in order for the offense to correspond to a federal analog;3 that whatever else “sexual abuse of a minor” may mean, it does
1. See Brief for Petitioner at 38–40, Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563
(2010) (No. 09-60); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2018) (“The term ‘aggravated felony’ means . . . illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in
section 802 of title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section
924(c) of Title 18).”); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2018) (“[T]he term ‘drug trafficking
crime’ means any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C.
951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46.”).
2. See Brief for the Petitioners at 41–47, Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478 (2012)
(No. 10-577); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) (“The term ‘aggravated felony’
means . . . an offense that—(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the
victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or (ii) is described in section 7201 of title 26
(relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds
$10,000.”).
3. See Brief for Petitioner at 44–47, Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016) (No. 141096); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(i) (“The term ‘aggravated felony’ means
. . . an offense described in [section 844(i) of title 18] . . . .”); 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)
(2018) (providing, inter alia, that “[w]hoever maliciously damages or destroys, or
attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building,
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not include statutory rape offenses in states where the age of consent
is sixteen or seventeen;4 and that a charging document that omits the
“time and place” of the alien’s initial removal hearing should not trigger the cessation of continuous physical presence for purposes of establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal.5
The rule, first enunciated in the late 1940s, is framed as a
tiebreaking rule of strict construction: when a provision of the INA
can be read in two plausible ways, a reviewing court is bound to adopt
the less restrictive or harsh reading of the statute.6 In other words, in
cases of doubt, that doubt should be resolved in line with the interpretation that would entail the least adverse consequences for the alien
facing deportation or seeking relief from removal.7 The problem is,
however, that although frequently invoked by the immigration bar
and often paid lip service to by the Supreme Court itself, the rule has
never done significant work in interpreting the immigration laws. It
has invariably been a tool of absolute last resort, brought to the table
of decision only once an interpretation has been settled upon and invoked, i.e., only as a final justification in support of a construction al-

4.

5.

6.

7.

vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce
or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for
not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years, fined under this title, or both”).
See Brief for the Petitioner at 35–45, Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct.
1562 (2017) (No. 16-54); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (“The term ‘aggravated
felony’ means—murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor.”).
See Brief for Petitioner at 44–48, Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) (No.
17-459); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2018) (“In removal proceedings under section 1229a of this title, written notice (in this section referred to as a ‘notice to
appear’) shall be given in person to the alien . . . specifying” certain information,
including “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be held.”); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a)(2) (2018) (requiring seven years of continuous residence for an alien
previously admitted for lawful permanent residency to establish eligibility for
cancellation of removal); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (requiring ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States for a nonpermanent resident alien); 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (“[A]ny period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to end . . . when the alien is
served a notice to appear under section 1229(a) of this title . . . .”); see generally
Patrick J. Glen & Alanna R. Kennedy, The Strange and Unexpected Afterlife of
Pereira v. Sessions, 34 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 24–28 (2019).
See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (“[S]ince the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on
his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible
meanings of the words used.”); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
449 (1987) (characterizing the rule as a “principle of construing any lingering
ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien”).
See, e.g., Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10 (“We resolve the doubts in favor of that
construction because deportation is a drastic measure and at times the
equivalent of banishment or exile.” (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388
(1947))); see also INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966) (“Even if there were
some doubt as to the correct construction of the statute, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the alien.”).
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ready sufficiently supported by traditional tools of interpretation.
Even assuming the rule has done work in the past, its irrelevance in a
post-Chevron world is clear: if there are two plausible interpretations
of a statutory provision, the agency’s interpretation must control so
long as reasonable and permissible, and regardless of whether another
interpretation is in some sense “better” or preferred by the reviewing
court.
This Article seeks to fill the role of Antony: “I come to bury” the
immigration rule of lenity, “not to praise” it.8 The Supreme Court
should, at the earliest opportunity, inter the rule as the anachronism
it is. As already stated, it is questionable as to whether the rule has
ever played anything but a rhetorical role in the decisions of the Supreme Court. But whatever its historical legacy may be, it has no further service to pay in the deference-oriented world of the modern
administrative state. The Chevron framework establishes the appropriate tiebreaking mechanism for interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, and the immigration rule of lenity has no work to do
within that framework and no relevance outside it.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. The first Part traces the formative years of the rule, its initial genesis and the Supreme Court’s subsequent refinements. This Part demonstrates the shaky foundations
of the rule in cases where there was no serious debate over the scope
of the proper interpretation of the statute. In other words, the rule is
developed not only in cases where it plays no role in the decision but
also in cases where the parties and the Court itself were more or less
on the same page regarding how the statute should be interpreted.
This shaky foundation is not solidified by the Court’s subsequent “refinements” of the rule, and in any event, the rule continued to play
only an adjunct role to decisions through the late 1950s. The second
Part advances the timeline to 1964, with the first section addressing
the two most significant post-1958, pre-Chevron decisions presenting
the issue. Although a closer call, these cases too provide little indication of a meaty role for lenity. The second section heralds the advent of
Chevron and its application in immigration cases, with the third section then proceeding to the Supreme Court’s post-Chevron lenity decisions. Finally, the third Part addresses the question of what role
lenity could play in contemporary administrative law. This Part begins by reviewing the rule of strict construction of penal statutes, i.e.,
the criminal or traditional “rule of lenity.” This review provides a
baseline of sorts for how lenity may operate in the immigration context, but it is also tempered by the strictures of Chevron. Thus, this
Part proceeds to assess the question of how or why lenity could operate within the Chevron framework. It concludes that whether at step
8. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2.
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one or step two, lenity is out of place, while also rejecting a proposed
“outside-Chevron” role for lenity. In the end, however, this Part concludes that the death of lenity should be of little moment; the concerns
that animated lenity are more or less safeguarded by the Chevron
framework. Under Chevron, as under lenity, there is no risk that
aliens will be subject to arbitrary, capricious, or irrational interpretations of the immigration laws.
II. GENESIS AND REFINEMENT: THE RULE OF STRICT
CONSTRUCTION, 1947–1958
This Part traces the origins of the immigration rule of lenity from
the late 1940s to the late 1950s, essentially the “foundational” period
for the rule. In some ways, this temporal scope is arbitrary; structurally, this Part could also fold in the two cases from the 1960s discussed
infra and frame the discussion as effectively two periods divided by
the advent of Chevron deference in 1984. The instant framing makes
sense for two reasons. First, the foundational period is, on the whole,
concerned with statutory provisions that predate the enactment of the
Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952. It thus makes sense to treat
this class of cases separately from the cases that implicate the rule
and began to arise in the 1960s. The unifying characteristic of Part III
of this Article, therefore, is the law to be applied, and a similar point
could be made about this Part. Second, the rule was “accepted” to a
larger degree by 1964. This Part is not concerned with application of
an accepted rule, but with tracing the origins of that rule—why and
how it arose and was given shape by the early decisions applying it.
Accordingly, the framing in Parts II and III does have much to recommend it, even if it could be presented in a different grouping.
Section A of this Part presents the origins of the immigration rule
of lenity in the doctrine of strict construction announced by the Supreme Court in Delgadillo v. Carmichael and Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan. But as that section notes, from the very beginning the rule was on
shaky footing—it was an adjunct to normal tools of statutory construction that played little role in either decision; the interpretations
adopted by the Court in both cases were not meaningfully contested by
the parties, making resort to the rule unnecessary; the statement of
the rule was in tension with its related rule of strict construction of
penal statutes; and the entire development of the rule can be laid at
the feet of Justice Douglas, whose creation of the rule was more rhetorical than substantive, deriving from a contestable view of the nature of deportation proceedings. Section B carries the historical review
from 1950 through 1958, in a trio of decisions—one rejecting application of the rule, and two raising the rule in the course of rendering a
statutory interpretation that ultimately favored the alien. As this section concludes, however, the same pre-1950 flaws are present in these
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cases. Most importantly, the rule continued to play no apparent role in
the decision of these cases. To the extent the rule was noted by majorities in two of the cases, traditional tools of statutory construction had
proven sufficient to resolve the case even prior to invoking lenity. The
foundational period thus introduces a strain that unifies cases as disparate as 1947’s Delgadillo and 2001’s INS v. St. Cyr: the immigration
rule of lenity is a rhetorical device, not a substantive rule of decision.
A.

Genesis: Delgadillo and Fong Haw Tan

Delgadillo was a Mexican citizen who lawfully entered the United
States in 1923 and resided here through June 1942.9 That same
month, he shipped out from Los Angeles on a merchant ship for an
intercoastal voyage to New York City via the Panama Canal.10 Unfortunately, the ship was torpedoed sometime after exiting the Panama
Canal, and Delgadillo was rescued and taken to Cuba.11 After one
week of recuperation at the United States consulate in Cuba, he returned to the United States through Miami, Florida, where he resumed his service as a merchant seaman.12 This idyll was upended in
March 1944, however, when Delgadillo was convicted of second-degree
robbery in California and sentenced to one year to life imprisonment.13 On the basis of that conviction, he was charged with deportability as an “alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment
for a term of one year or more because of a conviction in this country of
a crime involving moral turpitude, committed within five years after
entry of the alien to the United States.”14
The immigration officer, affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals, sustained the charge of removability, concluding that Delgadillo’s arrival in Miami in June 1942 “constituted an ‘entry’ ” into
the United States.15 A district court granted a writ of habeas corpus,
but the Ninth Circuit reversed, upholding the agency determination.16
The Ninth Circuit noted language in prior Supreme Court opinions
that characterized the term “entry” as broad and relating to any coming or going of an alien into the United States. The Supreme Court
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Delgadillo, 332 U.S. at 389.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 389–90.
Id. at 390; see 8 U.S.C. § 155(a) (1940) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)
(2018)); Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889. This
section of the Immigration Act was later renumbered as § 19(a), which is how it
will be referred to herein. See Alien Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 76-670, § 20, 54
Stat. 670, 671 (1940).
15. See Del Guercio v. Delgadillo, 159 F.2d 130, 132 (9th Cir. 1947), rev’d 332 U.S.
388 (1947).
16. Id. at 131–32.
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had stated, for instance, that “[t]he word ‘entry’ by its own force implies a coming from outside. The context shows that in order that
there be an entry within the meaning of the act there must be an arrival from some foreign port or place.”17 Broader still, that Court had
opined that “the word ‘entry’ . . . includes any coming of an alien from
a foreign country into the United States whether such coming be the
first or any subsequent one.”18 Applying these precedents, the court of
appeals found the question of the voluntariness of landing on foreign
soil, thus necessitating an entry into the United States, “immaterial in
considering whether his return to this country constitutes an ‘entry’
within the Immigration Act.”19 The Ninth Circuit noted that it had
already rejected that argument in a similar case presenting a shipwreck, a rescue entailing time spent in a foreign country, and a return
to the United States, holding that such a return constituted an “entry”
for immigration purposes.20 The court also emphasized that it was not
the wreck and entry itself that subjected Delgadillo to immigration
consequences but his subsequent conviction for a criminal offense:
“The Government is not asking that appellee be deported because the
exigencies of war forced him to land in Cuba. Appellee is being deported because, within five years after his entry, he was convicted of
robbery.”21
The Supreme Court reversed.22 Although it recognized that the
cases relied on by the Ninth Circuit did ostensibly lend support to the
court of appeals’ holding, it also distinguished those cases as presenting circumstances “where the alien plainly expected or planned to
enter a foreign port or place.”23 Delgadillo, in contrast, “was catapulted into the ocean, rescued, and taken to Cuba. He had no part in
selecting the foreign port as his destination. His itinerary was forced
on him by wholly fortuitous circumstances.”24 Deeming his return to
the United States an “entry” within the meaning of the immigration
laws would give that term a “capricious application.”25 The Court
noted approvingly the then-recent decision of Judge Learned Hand in
Di Pasquale v. Karnuth.26 In that case, an alien had boarded a train in
Buffalo bound for Detroit, that unbeknownst to him passed through
17.
18.
19.
20.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401 (1929).
United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 425 (1933) (emphasis added).
Delgadillo, 159 F.2d at 132.
See Taguchi v. Carr, 62 F.2d 307, 308 (9th Cir. 1932) (“[W]e are compelled to hold
that, notwithstanding the misfortune which befell appellant, he was coming from
a foreign country and therefore was subject to the immigration laws the same as
though he had never resided in the United States.”).
Delgadillo, 159 F.2d at 133.
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 388 (1947).
Id. at 390.
Id.
Id. at 390–91.
Id. at 391; see Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947).
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Canada.27 Because of the route through Canada, immigration authorities deemed the alien’s disembarkation in Detroit an “entry” and subsequently charged him with removability based on criminal
convictions entered both before and after this “entry.”28 Before the
Second Circuit, argument turned entirely on whether the alien’s return was an “entry”: if so, he was clearly deportable, but if not, he was
clearly not amendable to deportation.29 Judge Hand concluded that
the alien did not make an entry when the train returned to the United
States, relying on the inability of the alien to effect any change in that
route or to voluntarily assent to departure from the United States.30
In Judge Hand’s view:
Caprice in the incidence of punishment is one of the indicia of tyranny, and
nothing can be more disingenuous than to say that deportation in these circumstances is not punishment. It is well that we should be free to rid ourselves of those who abuse our hospitality; but it is more important that the
continued enjoyment of that hospitality once granted, shall not be subject to
meaningless and irrational hazards.31

The Supreme Court concurred in this notion in rejecting the court
of appeals’ view that Delgadillo had effected an “entry” in 1942, opining that “[d]eportation can be the equivalent of banishment or exile.”32
And so the rule of strict construction was given its first iteration:
We will not attribute to Congress a purpose to make his right to remain here
dependent on circumstances so fortuitous and capricious as those upon which
the Immigration Service has here seized. The hazards to which we are now
asked to subject the alien are too irrational to square with the statutory
scheme.33

The Supreme Court returned to the issue one year later in a case
presenting a variation on the “crime involving moral turpitude”
ground for deportation.34 Along with a single conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude committed within five years of entry, the
1917 Act also provided for the deportation of “any alien who, after
May 1, 1917, . . . is sentenced more than once to [a term of one year or
more] of imprisonment because of conviction in this country of any
crime involving moral turpitude, committed at any time after entry.”35
Fong Haw Tan, a Chinese national and citizen, was convicted of two
murders in a two-count indictment, and sentenced in one judgment to
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Di Pasquale, 158 F.2d at 878.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 878–79.
Id. at 879.
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947) (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 135, 147 (1945)).
33. Id.
34. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948).
35. 8 U.S.C. § 155(a) (1940) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2018)); see Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889.
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a period of life imprisonment.36 He was subsequently paroled for purposes of being taken into custody by the immigration service and was
then charged with deportability under § 19(a) based on his convictions.37 Fong Haw Tan sought habeas relief, arguing that “he [was]
sentenced but once, and hence, having resided here more than five
years before the crimes were committed, he is not subject to deportation.”38 The district court denied issuance of the writ, as did the Ninth
Circuit,39 which relied on its extant precedent:
The purpose of Congress [in enacting the crime involving moral turpitude provision] undoubtedly was to provide for the deportation of a man who committed more than one offense involving moral turpitude for which he had been
convicted and upon which conviction and sentence has been imposed; whether
the sentence run concurrently or consecutively is entirely immaterial from the
standpoint of the purpose of the law.40

In essence, two offenses qualify under the statute, regardless of how
the sentence is itself imposed, so long as the alien has been convicted
of both offenses.41
Interpretation of this clause of § 19(a) implicated a multi-pronged
conflict amongst the courts of appeals. Along with the Ninth Circuit,
the First Circuit had concluded that conviction for any two crimes
brings the alien within the purview of § 19(a), regardless of whether
the acts are in one criminal scheme and regardless of how the sentence is imposed.42 The Second Circuit had held that two convictions
qualify under the statute when the sentences imposed run consecutively, but not when the sentences run concurrently.43 The Fourth
Circuit had held that the two crimes for which the alien is convicted
must arise out of distinct criminal transactions, but if that condition is
met, it is not relevant how the sentences are imposed, i.e., concur36. Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 8.
37. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 155(a) (providing that an alien covered by this provision “shall,
upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported”)
(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)).
38. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 162 F.2d 663, 664 (9th Cir. 1947), rev’d, 333 U.S. 6
(1948).
39. Id. at 663.
40. Nishimoto v. Nagle, 44 F.2d 304, 306 (9th Cir. 1930).
41. Fong Haw Tan, 162 F.2d at 665 (“[T]here is no harsh injustice involved that justifies a judicial search for a limitation of the plainly expressed scope of the statute.
Within five years of entry, one base act of the alien ends his permissive stay; after
five years two base acts ends it.”).
42. See Clark v. Orabona, 59 F.2d 187, 189 (1st Cir. 1932) (finding the alien deportable where acts arose out of the same criminal scheme, two indictments were
entered, and two sentences imposed); Nishimoto, 44 F.2d at 305–06 (similar).
43. See United States ex rel. Mignozzi v. Day, 51 F.2d 1019, 1021 (2d Cir. 1931) (holding concurrent sentences do not meet the requirement, even if entered for distinct
offenses); Johnson v. United States ex rel. Pepe, 28 F.2d 810, 811–12 (2d Cir.
1928) (holding a single indictment for multiple offenses where sentences are imposed consecutively qualifies).
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rently or consecutively.44 Finally, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
convictions must be based on distinct criminal incidents subject to distinct sentencing, i.e., the statute contemplated multiple sentencings
for multiple crimes occurring at different points in time.45
The Supreme Court ultimately adopted the Fifth Circuit’s view.46
Relying largely on legislative history, which seemed to support the
view that Congress was concerned with recidivist offenders, the Court
held that § 19(a) “authorize[s] deportation only where an alien having
committed a crime involving moral turpitude and having been convicted and sentenced, once again commits a crime of that nature and
is convicted and sentenced for it.”47 Having resolved the issue based
on the language of the statute and legislative history and intent, the
Court nonetheless went on to opine, “We resolve the doubts in favor of
that construction because deportation is a drastic measure and at
times the equivalent of banishment or exile.”48 Developing the principle as announced in Delgadillo, the Court concluded, “[S]ince the
stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that
Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words
used.”49
So was the immigration rule of lenity begotten. Contemporary
cases, as well as advocates, return especially to Fong Haw Tan to
ground invocation of the rule. But these cases provide at best a shaky
foundation for a robust command that ambiguities in deportation statutes must be resolved in favor of the alien. In this regard, at least four
points bear mentioning.
First, in these cases, as with a fair reading of every decision in
which the rule has been invoked, application of lenity was not necessary. In Delgadillo, the Supreme Court properly noted that it had not
44. See Tassari v. Schmucker, 53 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1931) (“In our opinion the
correct principle to be deduced from these decisions is that where the crimes are
separate and distinct and there is a separate sentence for each offense it must be
held within the meaning of the act that the alien has been ‘sentenced more than
once’ even though the separate sentences are made to run concurrently and not
consecutively.”).
45. See Wallis v. Tecchio, 65 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 1933) (“The alien is sentenced
once when, after a conviction or plea of guilty, he is called before the bar and
receives judgment, whether for one or several crimes, with one or several terms of
imprisonment. He is sentenced more than once when that happens again.”); see
also Opolich v. Fluckey, 47 F.2d 950, 950 (N.D. Ga. 1930) (“[I]n my opinion Congress had in mind what are commonly called ‘repeaters,’ that is to say, persons
who commit a crime and are sentenced, and then commit another and are sentenced again.”).
46. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 9 (1948).
47. Id. at 9–10.
48. Id. at 10 (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947)).
49. Id.
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previously addressed the voluntariness of departure in assessing
whether an alien made a subsequent “entry” into the United States.50
Although its cases could be read to support a broad construction of the
term “entry,” the Court ultimately determined that the better interpretation of that language would account for the nature of the alien’s
departure from the United States.51 This common-sense interpretation was imposed prior to resort to any strict-construction canon.52 In
Fong Haw Tan, the issue was resolved by construing the statutory
language in conjunction with the legislative history, which indicates
that Congress sought to target repeat criminal offenders who engaged
in multiple, distinct criminal transactions.53 Only after resolving the
question in favor of this interpretation, and by using traditional tools
of statutory construction, did the Court then opine that any doubts, if
still held, should be resolved in favor of that interpretation in light of
the rule of strict construction.54 But upon application of the traditional interpretive tools, there were no remaining doubts.55
Second, a corollary to the first point: in both cases the Government
either agreed with the interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court
or declined to defend the harsher interpretation adopted by the court
of appeals. In Delgadillo, the Government, consistent also with the
Supreme Court, recognized that a strict and literal application of the
text of the statute could support the Ninth Circuit’s decision.56 But it
declined to press that interpretation: “Upon reconsideration . . . we are
inclined to suggest that the Congress may not have intended that an
‘entry’ for the purposes of the immigration laws should be predicated
upon a genuinely involuntary departure from the United States, i.e.,
an involuntary going to a foreign port or place.”57 In the Government’s
view, the Supreme Court’s prior decisions did not foreclose this interpretation; it was consistent with the general principle that consequences should not be attached to involuntary acts, and the agency
had itself, in other circumstances, concluded that where the alien had
no control over the departure there was no subsequent entry upon return.58 For instance, when an alien service member was deployed
abroad with the armed forces, he was not deemed to effect an “entry”
when he returned, since the departure was not within his control.59
The Government submitted:
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Delgadillo, 332 U.S. at 390.
Id. at 390–91.
Id.
Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 9–10.
Id.
Id.
Brief for the Respondent at 7–8, Delgadillo, 332 U.S. 388 (No. 63).
Id. at 20.
Id. at 20, 23.
Id. at 23.
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It seems to us that this ruling is clearly sound in recognizing that such departure and return of an alien serviceman is a matter completely beyond his control. In principle, we are unable to distinguish an involuntary landing in a
foreign country resulting from a torpedoing or shipwreck from the situation of
the alien in the armed forces.60

Likewise, in Fong Haw Tan, the government declined to defend the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute and instead argued that
the Fourth Circuit’s construction was the preferred view.61 Contrary
to the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation required that
the crimes arise from distinct criminal transactions, although sentencing could occur in a single proceeding and be imposed either concurrently or consecutively.62 The Supreme Court did not adopt this view
in whole, but the interpretation it did adopt was similar: the decision
adopted the Fifth Circuit’s view, which required not only that the offenses had to arise from distinct criminal transactions but also that
the sentencings had to be separate, i.e., the alien had to be brought
twice before the court for purposes of sentencing.63 Thus, in Delgadillo
there was no adversarial posture regarding the interpretation of “entry” ultimately adopted by the Court; the alien and Government
agreed on a voluntariness requirement and that interpretation was
itself in accord with agency views. And in Fong Haw Tan, there was
little adversarial posture; the views of the parties and Court ultimately aligned to a high degree—nobody defended the broad interpretation adopted by the Ninth Circuit, and although the Court’s
interpretation was narrower than that proffered by the Government,
Fong Haw Tan would not have been deportable under either.64
Third, although appearing in two unanimous decisions of the Supreme Court, the immigration rule of lenity seems less a court-driven
jurisprudential development than a Justice Douglas rhetorical crusade. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion for the Court in both Delgadillo and Fong Haw Tan, and the initial precedential “hook” for his
opinion in Delgadillo was his own prior opinion in Bridges v. Wixon.65
60. Id.
61. Brief for the Respondent at 28–29, Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948)
(No. 370).
62. See supra note 44.
63. Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 8–9. Compare Tassari v. Schmucker, 53 F.2d 570, 573
(4th Cir. 1931) (“In our opinion the correct principle to be deduced from these
decisions is that where the crimes are separate and distinct and there is a separate sentence for each offense it must be held within the meaning of the act that
the alien has been ‘sentenced more than once’ even though the separate
sentences are made to run concurrently and not consecutively.”), with Wallis v.
Tecchio, 65 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 1933) (“The alien is sentenced once when, after
a conviction or plea of guilty, he is called before the bar and receives judgment,
whether for one or several crimes, with one or several terms of imprisonment. He
is sentenced more than once when that happens again.”).
64. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 61, at 30–33.
65. Delgadillo, 332 U.S. at 391.
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In that case, Justice Douglas wrote that “[t]hough deportation is not
technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this
land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted.”66 This characterization of deportation
was and is, at the least, contestable. Both before and after Bridges and
the subsequent development of the immigration rule of lenity, Supreme Court decisions have declined to characterize deportation as
punishment, a penalty, exile, or banishment.67 To the extent Justice
Douglas disagreed and wrote competing language into controlling
opinions of the Supreme Court, those specific views, never relevant to
the actual disposition of the case in which they were raised, should be
taken with a grain of salt.
Finally, the Court’s framing of the rule of strict construction for
immigration purposes was contrary to contemporary statements of the
rule of strict construction. In fact, the case recorded immediately after
Fong Haw Tan in the Supreme Court reports, United States v. Brown,
specifically rejected the contention that the rule of strict construction
requires the narrowest possible reading of statutory language.68 The
issue in Brown arose under the Federal Escape Act, which defined escape from “any penal or correctional institution” as a federal criminal
offense in qualifying circumstances, and included the following:
The sentence imposed hereunder shall be in addition to and independent of
any sentence imposed in the case in connection with which such person is held
in custody at the time of such escape or attempt to escape. If such person be
under sentence at the time of such offense, the sentence imposed hereunder
shall begin upon the expiration of, or upon legal release from, any sentence
66. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
67. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 526 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“This Court has long understood that an ‘order of deportation is not a punishment for crime.’ ” (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730
(1893))); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)
(“While the consequences of deportation may assuredly be grave, they are not
imposed as a punishment.” (citing Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952)));
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (“It is thoroughly established that
Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the
country it deems hurtful. The determination by facts that might constitute a
crime under local law is not a conviction of crime, nor is the deportation a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons who it does not
want.”); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 236 (1896) (“The order of
deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a ‘banishment,’ in the sense in
which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by
way of punishment. It is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country
of an alien who has not complied with the conditions upon the performance of
which the government of the nation, acting within its constitutional authority
and through the proper departments, has determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend.”).
68. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18 (1948).
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under which such person is held at the time of such escape or attempt to
escape.69

Brown was serving the first of three sentences that had been imposed,
to run consecutively, when he escaped and was subsequently convicted under the Escape Act.70 The question in the case was when the
sentence for the escape began to run—Was it at the end of the first
one-year sentence, that he was serving at the time of escape, or at the
end of the five-year aggregate term to which he had been sentenced?71
The Supreme Court held that the sentence under the Escape Act did
not begin to run until the completion of the total terms of imprisonment the defendant was serving at the time of the escape and, in doing
so, rejected the argument that the rule of strict construction required
it to adopt a more lenient interpretation.72 “The canon in favor of
strict construction is not an inexorable command to override common
sense and evident statutory purpose. It does not require a magnified
emphasis upon a single ambiguous word in order to give it a meaning
contradictory to the fair import of the whole remaining language.”73
Moreover, the rule does not “demand that a statute be given the ‘narrowest meaning’; it is satisfied if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers.”74 It is
difficult, if not impossible, to square this understanding of the rule of
strict construction with Justice Douglas’s view as expressed in Fong
Haw Tan. The major difference between Brown and Fong Haw Tan is
more prosaic: Justice Douglas was in dissent in Brown and unable to
import his whims into the dicta of the Court’s opinion.75
B.

Refinement and Application, 1950–1958

Between 1950 and 1958, the immigration rule of lenity was referenced on at least three occasions, with varying results for the alien. In
United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, the Supreme Court
was called upon to decide whether an alien could be deported after
being denaturalized, based on convictions incurred while he was a citizen.76 Eichenlaub was naturalized in 1936, but in 1941 he was convicted of violating the Espionage Act of 1917 and sentenced to
69. 18 U.S.C. § 753h (1940) (emphasis added) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 751
(2018)).
70. Brown, 333 U.S. at 19–20.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 22–25.
73. Id. at 25–26.
74. Id. at 26 (quoting United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 530 (1944)) (citing
United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 552 (1938); United States v. Giles, 300
U.S. 41, 48 (1937); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936); United States v.
Corbett, 215 U.S. 233 (1909)).
75. Id. at 27.
76. United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (1950).
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eighteen months’ imprisonment.77 In 1944, he was denaturalized “by
consent” based on alleged fraud in the procurement of his naturalization.78 Following denaturalization, deportation proceedings were instituted, where he was charged with deportability based on his
criminal conviction.79 The relevant provision provided for the deportability of “[a]ll aliens who since August 1, 1914, have been or may
hereafter be convicted of any violation or conspiracy to violate any of
the following sections, the judgment on such conviction having become
final, namely:” the Espionage Act of 1917.80
On a 4–3 vote, with Justices Douglas and Clark not participating,
the Supreme Court upheld application of this provision to Eichenlaub,
rejecting the argument that he could not be deported based on a conviction entered while he was a naturalized citizen.81 According to the
majority, the language of the statute requires that:
[A]ll persons to be deported under this Act shall be “aliens.” [It] do[es] not
limit its scope to aliens who never have been naturalized. [It] do[es] not exempt those who have secured certificates of naturalization, but then have lost
them by court order on the ground of fraud in their procurement. [It] do[es]
not suggest that such persons are not as clearly “aliens” as they were before
their fraudulent naturalization.82

The majority saw the case as simple—Eichenlaub was an alien who
was convicted of an offense in the deportation statute and was thus
deportable. For this reason, “there [wa]s no occasion to restrict [the]
language [of the statute] so as to narrow its plain meaning.”83 The
majority recognized the substantial issue presented by the case as
“whether the Act requires that the relators not only must have been
‘aliens’ at the times when they were ordered deported, but . . . also
have had that status at the times when they were convicted of designated offenses against the national security.”84 But the statute did not
require by its plain terms alienage at the time of conviction; instead, it
was triggered when two conditions precedent were met, a conviction
for a relevant offense and alienage.85 “When both conditions are met
and, after hearing, the Attorney General finds them to be undesirable
residents of the United States, the Act is satisfied.”86 The majority
finally buttressed this plain language interpretation by reference to
legislative intent: the intent of Congress had been to deport undesirable aliens convicted of crimes against national security, and there
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 523.
Id. at 523–24.
Id. at 524.
8 U.S.C. § 157(1) (1940) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2018)).
Eichenlaub, 338 U.S. at 523, 533.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 529.
Id.
Id. at 530.
Id.
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was no indication that Congress would have wanted to distinguish between naturalized citizens and aliens when deciding whether to deport an alien following his denaturalization.87
Justice Frankfurter dissented, however, joined by Justices Black
and Jackson.88 In Justice Frankfurter’s view, the immigration rule of
lenity should have provided the rule of decision: “I deem it my duty
not to squeeze [the language of the statute] so as to yield every possible hardship of which its words are susceptible.”89 The dissent would
have held that the statute “should be read to apply only to one who
was an alien when convicted and should not be made to apply to persons in the position of these petitioners,” i.e., it should not apply to
denaturalized citizens whose convictions were entered while citizens.90 This interpretation of the statute was plausible and reasonable, and so for Justice Frankfurter, the question came down to the
consequences the competing interpretations entailed.91 “Where, as
here, a statute permits either of two constructions without violence to
language, the construction which leads to hardship should be rejected
in favor of the permissible construction consonant with humane
considerations.”92
In Barber v. Gonzales, decided four years later, the Court returned
to the question of how the term “entry” should be applied.93 Gonzales
was “born a national of the United States in” pre-independence Philippines.94 He entered the United States in 1930, prior to independence,
and had not departed since.95 In 1941, “he was convicted . . . of assault
with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to imprisonment for one
year,” and in 1950, “he was convicted . . . of second degree burglary”
and given an indeterminate sentence with a two-year minimum.96
Based on these convictions, Gonzales was charged with deportability
as an alien convicted of more than one crime involving moral turpitude after entry, for which a sentence of one year or more had been
imposed.97 Gonzales filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he had not made an “entry” to the United States within the
meaning of § 19(a) since he had not come from a foreign territory or
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See id. at 530–32.
Id. at 533 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 534.
Id. (“Since such construction is not unreasonable, due regard for consequences
demands that the statute be so read.”).
Id.
Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637 (1954).
Id. at 638.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 155(a) (1946), amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1952) (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2018)).
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port.98 The district court denied the writ, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and ordered Gonzales’s release from detention.99
The Supreme Court granted review to consider “whether [Gonzales]—who was born a national of the United States in the Philippine
Islands, who came to the continental United States as a national prior
to the Philippine Independence Act of 1934 . . . may now be deported
under § 19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917.”100 The Government
largely based its argument on the Philippine Independence Act of
1934, which provided that “[f]or the purposes of the Immigration Act
of 1917, . . . this section, and all other laws of the United States relating to the immigration, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens, citizens of the
Philippine Islands who are not citizens of the United States shall be
considered as if they were aliens.”101 According to the Government,
although Gonzales was a national upon his entry to the United States,
the independence of the Philippines and the conditions under which
that independence was granted, negated that status.102 Since he was
not a citizen of the United States, he should be considered an alien,
and thus subject to removal based on his convictions.103
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that it was
premised on a fundamental misapprehension relating to whether
Gonzales had ever made an “entry” within the meaning of § 19(a).104
Although in common parlance Gonzales made an entry into the
United States when he arrived in 1930, “some terms acquire a special
technical meaning by a process of judicial construction,” and the majority found “entry” to be one of those words.105 Examining its precedent, the Court read entry as requiring “an arrival from some foreign
port or place.”106 In 1930, when Gonzales entered the United States,
“he was not arriving ‘from some foreign port or place.’ On the contrary,
he was a United States national moving from one of our insular possessions to the mainland.”107 The Court’s holding was premised on its
view of the “well-settled meaning of ‘entry,’ ”108 but it also referenced
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Barber, 347 U.S. at 638.
Id.
Id. at 638–39.
Philippine Independence Act, Pub. L. No. 73-127, § 8(a)(1), 48 Stat. 456, 462
(1934).
Barber, 347 U.S. at 639–40.
Id. at 640 (“[B]y virtue of this provision [of the 1934 Act] the respondent was
assimilated to the status of an alien for purposes of ‘immigration, exclusion, or
expulsion’; and that, having been twice convicted thereafter of crimes involving
moral turpitude, he is deportable under § 19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917.”).
Id.
Id. at 641.
Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401 (1929)).
Id. at 638, 642 (emphasis added).
Id. at 642.
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the rule of strict construction.109 This reference, however, only serves
to clarify the textual and precedential basis for the Court’s decision:
“In the absence of explicit language showing a contrary congressional
intent, we must give technical words in deportation statutes their
usual technical meaning.”110 In other words, Congress was free to alter the meaning of “entry” that had developed through judicial decisions, but until it did so, the Court would continue to apply its
traditional interpretation of the term.
Justice Minton dissented, joined by Justices Reed and Burton.111
The disagreement centered on what exactly the “well-settled” meaning of “entry” was.112 The dissent maintained that “entry” should be
given its “ordinary meaning,”113 and that nothing in the legislative
history or the Court’s own precedent “reveals [anything] sufficient to
indicate that Congress did not intend the word ‘entry’ in section 19
should have its ordinary meaning.”114 The dissent found the invocation of lenity especially inapt:
I know of no good reason why we should by strained construction of an Act
compel the United States to cling onto alien criminals. It is not the public
policy of this country to construe its statutes strictly in favor of alien criminals
whose convictions have already been established of record.115

The Court returned to the definition of “entry” in Bonetti v. Rogers,
capping this foundational period in the rule’s history.116 Under the
Internal Security Act of 1950, any “alien who had been a member of
the Communist Party of the United States after entry into the United
States” was deportable.117 Bonetti first entered the United States in
1923, became a dues-paying member of the Communist Party in 1932,
but left the party in 1936.118 In 1937, he abandoned his residence in
the United States to fight in the Spanish Civil War but was readmitted in October 1938 as a quota immigrant.119 He was not at that time
a member of the Communist Party, nor had he joined the Party after
entry.120 Nonetheless, in 1951, after passage of the Internal Security
Act of 1950, deportation proceedings were instituted based on his ear109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 642–43 (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)).
Id. at 643.
Id.
Id. at 643–44 (Minton, J., dissenting).
Id. at 643.
Id. at 644 (quoting United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 425 (1933)).
Id. at 643; see id. at 644 (“Because of the Court’s strict construction of this statute, which has the effect of putting a liberal construction on the statute in favor of
the alien criminal, which I believe to be contrary to the public policy of this country, I dissent.”).
Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691 (1958).
Id. at 693.
Id. at 692.
Id.
Id. at 693.
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lier membership, he was found deportable, and both the district court
and court of appeals affirmed that determination.121
The Supreme Court reversed.122 The Court agreed that the 1950
Act was meant to target aliens who were Communist Party members
at the time of their admission, or those who became members at any
point after their admission.123 The disagreement centered on what entry counted for purposes of applying the provision: Bonetti argued that
it was the 1938 entry that was relevant for assessing his deportability;124 the government argued that any entry may qualify, and
that for purposes of assessing his deportability, it was fair to use the
1923 entry as the relevant entry.125 The majority deemed the 1938
entry the relevant entry in this “novel factual situation,”126 so concluding because it was the status granted in October 1938 that the
government sought to annul via deportation.127 Since Bonetti was not
at that time a member of the Communist Party, and had not joined at
any time since, he was not deportable.128 Although the language of
the 1950 Act was “quite ambiguous in [its] application to the question
here presented, we believe that our interpretation of [it] is the only
fair and reasonable construction that [its] cloudy provisions will permit under the rare and novel facts of this case.”129 And, of course, the
Court recognized that it could not “assume that Congress meant to
trench on [an alien’s] freedom beyond that which is required by the
narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.”130
Justice Clark, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, dissented, and would have held against the alien based on the plain text
of the statute.131 The legislative intent behind the 1950 Act was to
broadly encompass any alien who was a member of the Communist
Party at the time of or after any entry to the United States.132 In contrast with the words used by Congress, the dissent viewed the majority as impermissibly reading the term “last” into the statute to qualify
“entry.”133 But according to the dissent, the Court had already rejected the argument that Congress had a particular entry, of multiple
entries, in mind; in Volpe, for instance, the Court had rejected the argument that it was only the initial entry that mattered for purposes of
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 700.
at 694–95.
at 695.
at 696.
at 696–97.
at 697.
at 699.
(quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
at 700, 702 (Clark, J., dissenting).
at 700–02.
at 702.
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assessing application of the deportability provisions, not a subsequent
entry.134 The dissent noted:
Petitioner here makes the converse argument that the word “entering” should
be modified to read “last entering.” I would not so amend the statute in disregard of the long and uniform judicial, legislative, and administrative history
whereby “entry” has acquired a definitive, technical gloss, to wit, its ordinary
meaning and nothing more or less.135

The rule’s invocation between 1950 and 1958 established some
level of staying power for the principle; Delgadillo and Fong Haw Tan
were not to be solitary precedents in this regard.136 Yet many of the
same flaws that make the earlier cases weak precedents are equally
present in the later cases. Again, the rule was not relevant to the disposition of any case between 1950 and 1958; in Eichenlaub, the Court
resolved the case against the alien based on the plain language of the
statute, and in Barber, the Court based its holding on the specialized
meaning of “entry.” Bonetti is ostensibly a closer call, but the better
interpretation of the statute is that arrived at by the majority; Bonetti
was admitted to the United States in 1938, and it was the status
gained at that time that the government sought to annul through deportation. It is true that he had been admitted earlier, but that status
was surrendered upon departure in 1937. Given that fact there was no
compelling argument as to why the prior entry should then be the
touchstone for deportability in the 1950s. None of these decisions come
out differently in a world where the immigration rule of lenity does
not exist.
These cases also highlight the subjective grounds for the rule’s invocation. Applying the rule is contingent on finding ambiguity in statutory language, and clarity (or lack thereof) is not necessarily an
objective trait but is rather in the eye of the beholder. Justice Frankfurter dissented in Eichenlaub and advocated for what would have
been the most robust application of lenity in any of these initial five
cases,137 but he joined a dissent in Bonetti, finding that the plain language foreclosed the alien’s interpretation of the statute.138 Justice
Burton wrote the decision in Eichenlaub,139 deciding the case on plain
language grounds, but joined the majority in Bonetti, which invoked
(in some fashion) the rule of lenity.140 Justice Clark penned the dissent in Bonetti, finding recourse to lenity unnecessary given the plain
134. Id. at 703 (citing United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 425 (1933)).
135. Id.
136. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000)
(“[T]he conventional [nondelegation] doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad
ones (and counting).”).
137. United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521, 533–37 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
138. Bonetti, 356 U.S. at 700–03 (Clark, J., dissenting).
139. Eichenlaub, 338 U.S. at 522.
140. Bonetti, 356 U.S. at 692–700.
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language of the statute,141 while joining the majority in Barber, which
invoked the rule.142 The competing circumstances in which any one
Justice may be inclined to invoke lenity simply reinforce the obvious:
different judges may have different views of what the plain language
requires. But that fact also points away from lenity filling an important role. The Supreme Court is able to resolve these cases on de novo
review of the statutory language, and differences of opinion may be
accommodated within the broad ambit of “traditional statutory interpretation.” There is simply not a level of serious ambiguity in these
cases that would trigger a need to resort to a tiebreaking rule of absolute last resort.
III. THE IMMIGRATION RULE OF LENITY IN THE SUPREME
COURT, 1964–PRESENT
This Part picks up with the first cases utilizing the rule in conjunction with the Immigration and Nationality Act and carries the story
forward into the present. The temporal scope of this Part is, however,
bifurcated by a different development—the Supreme Court’s seminal
decision in Chevron. The decision in that case, and the extension of
administrative deference to immigration cases, essentially renders the
immigration rule of lenity irrelevant as a legal matter. Section A considers the two cases raising the rule decided in the 1960s and comes to
a familiar conclusion: the rule had little or no effect on the decision
rendered. Section B presents Chevron and its subsequent extension to
immigration proceedings, while section C considers how the rule has
been raised and considered in immigration cases post-Chevron. Although not a numerous data set, the rule’s references in the Court’s
post-Chevron cases fit the prevailing pattern. The rule is raised as an
afterthought or rhetorical device to clinch an interpretation otherwise
rendered through consideration of traditional tools of statutory construction. Beyond that point, there is also no support in these cases for
the proposition that lenity would trump deference. To the contrary,
the Court has assumed that where there is genuine ambiguity in a
statutory provision, i.e., Congress has provided a gap to be filled, it is
the agency’s prerogative to fill that gap in any reasonable and permissible manner.
A.

Pre-Chevron Applications: Costello and Errico

The rule was “applied” twice more in the 1960s before lying dormant for the better part of two decades, at least as an explicit princi141. Id. at 700–03 (Clark, J., dissenting).
142. Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 638–43 (1954).
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ple relied upon by the Court.143 In 1964, the Court revisited the
question of whether an alien who is denaturalized could then be deported based on criminal convictions entered while he was a citizen.144 With the advent of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, the prior crime-involving-moral-turpitude provision had been
revised. Under the 1952 Act:
Any alien in the United States . . . shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported who— . . . (4) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after entry and either sentenced to
confinement or confined therefor in a prison or corrective institution, for a
year or more, or who at any time after entry is convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct,
regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial . . . .145

The Court determined that Eichenlaub was not controlling, given both
differences in the relevant statutory language and the expressed intent of Congress.146 Although both language and history supported
the decision in Eichenlaub, “[n]either the language nor the history of
§ 241(a)(4) lends itself so easily to a similar construction.”147 On some
level, there were at least two plausible interpretations of the statutory
language:
The petitioner’s construction—that the language permits deportation only of a
person who was an alien at the time of his convictions, and the Court of Appeals’ construction—that the language permits deportation of a person now
an alien who at any time after entry has been convicted of two crimes, regardless of his status at the time of the convictions—are both possible readings of
the statute . . . .148

With neither language nor history proving definitive, the Court
looked to statutory structure and context. “Although no legislative history illumines our problem, considerable light is forthcoming from another provision of the statute itself.”149 Section 241(b)(2) provided that
“if the court sentencing such alien for such crime shall make, at the
time of first imposing judgment or passing sentence, or within thirty
143. It was also raised a third time, in dissent, in Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619 (1975), a
case that rejected a broad interpretation of the Court’s decision in INS v. Errico,
385 U.S. 214 (1966). There, Justice Brennan opined that “[e]ven if statutory language is unclear any doubt should be resolved in favor of the alien since ‘deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile.’
Today the Court strains to construe statutory language against the alien.” Reid,
420 U.S. at 633–34 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Brennan
was joined in dissent by Justice Marshall, who, ironically, had presented argument for the government in Errico, contending that the waiver provision should
be interpreted narrowly. Id. at 631; see Errico, 385 U.S. at 214, 217.
144. Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120 (1964).
145. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2018)).
146. See Costello, 376 U.S. at 123–24.
147. Id. at 124.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 126.
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days thereafter, a recommendation . . . that such alien not be deported,” the deportation would not take place.150 The Supreme Court
found that this provision would be inoperable for aliens who were convicted of crimes when naturalized citizens: “A naturalized citizen
would not ‘at the time of first imposing judgment or passing sentence,’
or presumably ‘within thirty days thereafter,’ be an ‘alien’ who could
seek to invoke the protections of this section of the law.”151 This factor
tipped the scales for the majority, which was hesitant to adopt a construction of § 241(a)(4) that “would, with respect to an entire class of
aliens, completely nullify a procedure so intrinsic a part of the legislative scheme.”152
Having resolved the case on its own interpretation of the statute,
with special emphasis on structure and context, the majority proceeded to pay homage to the immigration rule of lenity: even if resort
to structure in the form of § 241(b)(2) was not determinative, the Court
would “nonetheless be constrained by accepted principles of statutory
construction in this area of the law to resolve that doubt in favor of the
petitioner.”153 Concluding that convictions entered against an alien
while he was a citizen could count for purposes of deportability “might
find support in logic. But since the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his
freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several
possible meanings of the words used.”154
The dissent, in contrast, would have found the statutory language
sufficient to resolve the case against the alien, buttressed by relevant
legislative intent and the reasonableness of seeking deportation of
criminal aliens regardless of when the conviction was entered—during
the period of naturalization or after denaturalization.155 In Justice
White’s words, “I have no quarrel with the doctrine that where the
Court is unable to discern the intent of Congress, ambiguities should
be resolved in favor of the deportee, but here there is a clear expression of congressional purpose. I would carry it out.”156
In 1966, the Court had to confront an opaquely worded provision
pertaining to relief from deportation.157 The INA, as amended,
provided:
The provisions . . . relating to the deportation of aliens within the United
States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as aliens
150. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 241(b)(2), 66 Stat. 163,
208 (1952); see 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (1952) (repealed 1990).
151. Costello, 376 U.S. at 127.
152. Id. at 127–28.
153. Id. at 128.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 134, 147–48 (White, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 148.
157. See INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966).
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who have sought to procure, or have procured visas or other documentation, or
entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation shall not apply to
an alien otherwise admissible at the time of entry who is the spouse, parent,
or a child of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.158

The dispute in INS v. Errico centered on the “otherwise admissible”
language: Did that section apply to an alien with the necessary familial relationship, who entered or was admitted based on fraud or misrepresentation, but was inadmissible at the time of entry because of
national origin quota restrictions in place prior to the 1965 Act?159
The Government, with then-Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall
presenting argument before the Court, contended that “to be otherwise admissible at the time of entry the alien must show that he
would have been admitted even if he had not lied, and that the aliens
in these cases would not have been admitted because of the quota restrictions.”160 On the other side of the argument, the alien contended
that the Government’s construction was too narrow, since any material fraud or misrepresentation in connection with entry likely covered
up a fact that made the alien inadmissible; in other words, were the
alien otherwise admissible within the meaning of the Government’s
argument there would not be any reason to engage in conduct that
would implicate a need for the waiver.161
To resolve the question, the Court examined the history of provisions pertaining to discretionary relief for fraud or misrepresentations
connected to entry and admission.162 That history indicated that for
aliens with qualifying family relationships, establishing that they
were “otherwise admissible” did not include establishing that they
would have been admissible under the quota restrictions, i.e., an alien
would be entitled to relief for fraud connected with evading the quota
restrictions so long as the alien possessed a qualifying family relationship.163 The intent of the earlier provisions “not to require that aliens
who are close relatives of United States citizens have complied with
quota restrictions to escape deportation for their fraud is clear from its
language, and there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest
that Congress had in mind a contrary result” under either the earlier
158. Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 16, 75
Stat. 650, 655 (1961); see 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (Supp. III 1961) (repealed 1990).
159. Errico, 385 U.S. 214; see, e.g., Will Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 313 (1956) (“In 1924, Congress imposed
quantitative restrictions on the entry of aliens and established a national origins
quota system in which place of birth played a decisive role in the allocation of
visas. Deportation was ordered for those who thereafter entered without a valid
visa.”).
160. Errico, 385 U.S. at 217.
161. Id. at 217–18.
162. Id. at 218–23.
163. Id. at 222–23.
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Acts or when essentially restating those provisions in enacting
§ 241(f).164 The Court found this interpretation “further reinforced
when the section is regarded in the context of the 1957 Act. The fundamental purpose of this legislation was to unite families,” and that purpose was best served by adopting the broader interpretation of the
provision’s scope.165 Having again resolved the question presented on
more or less traditional grounds, the Court proceeded to application of
the immigration rule of lenity colored by the humanitarian concerns
already noted: “We conclude that to give meaning to the statute in the
light of its humanitarian purpose of preventing the breaking up of
families composed in part at least of American citizens, the conflict
between the circuits must be resolved in favor of the aliens.”166 In
other words, “[e]ven if there were some doubt as to the correct construction of the statute, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the
alien.”167
Nothing distinguishes the application of the rule in these cases
from the similarly rhetorical recitations of that rule in the cases between 1947 and 1958. The rule itself is largely an afterthought trotted
out only to buttress application of traditional tools of statutory construction. In Costello, the statutory structure was determinative; the
inclusion of § 241(b)(2) provided support for the contention that to be a
deportable offense, the offense had to be committed when the individual was an alien. Otherwise, a major procedural protection put into
place by the 1952 Act would have been rendered a dead letter for those
convicted of offenses while a citizen. Likewise, in Errico, the history
and statutory language was determinative; history illuminated the
meaning of “otherwise admissible” in the relief context, and established the irrelevance of the quota restrictions for judging the “admissibility” of aliens for purposes of the waiver.168 Legislative intent, too,
was important, and in Errico supported a liberal construction of the
statutory scheme. Lenity fits comfortably with the Court’s approach in
Errico, but that is less because of application of the rule itself than the
fact that here, unlike the earlier cases, the Court was actually addressing a statutory provision intended to provide a humanitarian
benefit to aliens.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 223.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 225.
Id.
But see Recent Developments: Immigration: The Criterion of “Otherwise Admissible” as a Basis for Relief from Deportation Because of Fraud or Misrepresentation,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 188, 195–97 (1966) (criticizing the Court’s review of statutory
history and opining that the Court misread the limited intent Congress evinced
in enacting Section 241(f) as a protection, mainly, for Mexican aliens who were
not subject to the quota restrictions).
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Chevron Deference and Immigration Law

The concept of judicial deference to the determinations of administrative agencies within their areas of competence predates 1984. In
1904, for instance, and with citation to cases as early as 1840, the
Supreme Court held:
[W]here Congress has committed to the head of a department certain duties
requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, his action thereon, whether
it involve questions of law or fact, will not be reviewed by the courts unless he
has exceeded his authority or this court should be of opinion that his action
was clearly wrong.169

In 1961, the Court opined:
This admonition has been consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the
given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting
the matters subjected to agency regulations.170

Where the agency’s choice “represents a reasonable accommodation of
conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the
statute, [the courts] should not disturb it unless it appears from the
statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one
that Congress would have sanctioned.”171
The Supreme Court’s decision in 1984 in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., molded this historical practice and gave form to the decisional framework that should govern a
court’s review of agency action.172 Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,173 “[s]tates that had not achieved [specified] national
air quality standards” were required to “establish a permit program
regulating ‘new or modified major stationary sources’ of air pollution.”174 The Environmental Protection Agency in turn promulgated a
regulation that allowed “nonattainment” states “to adopt a plantwide
definition of the term ‘stationary source.’ ”175 “Under [that] definition,
an existing plant that contains several pollution-emitting devices may
install or modify one piece of equipment without meeting the permit
conditions if the alteration will not increase the total emissions from
the plant.”176 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit set aside the regulations, holding that the “bubble169. Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1904); see id. at 109 (citing,
inter alia, Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840)).
170. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961).
171. Id. at 383.
172. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
173. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
174. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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based” definition of stationary source was “inappropriate” given the
ends of the 1977 Amendments—“to ‘improve [ ] air quality.’ ”177
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[t]he basic legal error
of the Court of Appeals was to adopt a static judicial definition of the
term ‘stationary source’ when it had decided that Congress itself had
not commanded that definition.”178 In so holding, the Court laid out
what would become known as the Chevron framework, a two-step process for determining the permissibility of an agency interpretation of a
statute it is charged with administering. The first step “is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.”179 The second step follows “if . . . the
court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue.”180 In such circumstances:
[T]he court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.181

The Court rooted this iteration of the rule in the reality of the modern
administrative state: “The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires
the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”182 Delegations may be express,
in which case the agency’s rule or decision must be “given controlling
weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.”183 Or they may be implied, in which case “a court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”184 In
Chevron itself, the Supreme Court concluded that the Clean Air Act
Amendments did not foreclose the regulation adopted by the EPA, and
that its “definition of the term ‘source’ [was] a permissible construc177. See NRDC v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting ASARCO, Inc.
v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
178. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
179. Id. at 842–43.
180. Id. at 843.
181. Id.
182. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).
183. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (citing United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834
(1984); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis,
432 U.S. 416, 424–26 (1977); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232,
235–37 (1936)).
184. Id. at 844.
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tion of the statute which seeks to accommodate progress in reducing
air pollution with economic growth.”185
Chevron has special relevance in the immigration context, where
Executive Branch authority and discretion have long been recognized
not only as integral components of the statutory scheme but as background principles implicated because of the very nature of immigration law. Deference to the political branches is rooted in the plenary
power, succinctly summarized by Justice Frankfurter in 1952:
The conditions for entry of every alien, the particular classes of aliens that
shall be denied entry altogether, the basis for determining such classification,
the right to terminate hospitality to aliens, the grounds on which such determination shall be based, have been recognized as matters solely for the responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the power of this Court to
control.186

Thus, even before Chevron, the Supreme Court had noted that “it is
important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that
‘over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more
complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.”187 Furthermore,
“[o]ur cases ‘have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens
as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s
political departments largely immune from judicial control.’ ”188 In
other words, “the power over aliens is of a political character and
therefore subject only to narrow judicial review.”189
As a statutory matter, the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that the “determination and ruling by the Attorney General with
respect to all questions of law shall be controlling.”190 The statute is
otherwise replete with express delegations of decisional authority to
the Attorney General, many of which decisions are in his or her sole
discretion.191 The applicability of Chevron to immigration decisions
185. Id. at 866.
186. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 596–97 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
187. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)) (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766
(1972)).
188. Id. (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)) (citing Harisiades,
342 U.S. 580; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S.
581 (1889)).
189. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976) (citing Fong Yue Ting,
149 U.S. at 713).
190. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2018).
191. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (2018) (“The Attorney General shall establish such
regulations, prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and other papers, issue such instructions, review such administrative determinations in immigration
proceedings, delegate such authority, and perform such other acts as the Attorney General determines to be necessary for carrying out this section.”); 8 U.S.C.
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has thus been accepted by the Supreme Court since the very first
cases arose presenting the question.192
“It is [thus] clear that principles of Chevron deference are applicable to this statutory scheme.”193 If anything, the typical deference extended to agencies under Chevron was characterized as “heightened”
in the arena of immigration law. The Supreme Court has “recognized
that judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context where officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign
relations.’”194 In Aguirre-Aguirre, for instance, the Supreme Court rejected a Ninth Circuit decision that had been inadequately deferential
to the agency’s determination of what constituted a “serious non-political crime” for purposes of denying a claim to withholding of removal.195 But as the Court noted:
A decision by the Attorney General to deem certain violent offenses committed
in another country as political in nature, and to allow the perpetrators to remain in the United States, may affect our relations with that country or its
neighbors. The judiciary is not well positioned to shoulder primary responsibility for assessing the likelihood and importance of such diplomatic
repercussions.196

C.

Post-Chevron Applications: An Outmoded Rule

Whatever role the rule could be said to have played in the Supreme
Court’s pre-Chevron cases, it has not been, fairly construed, even a

192.

193.
194.
195.
196.

§ 1158(b)(1)(A) (2018) (including “the Attorney General may grant asylum to an
alien who has applied for asylum in accordance with the requirements and procedures” he has established); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)–(b) (2018) (proscribing discretionary relief in the form of cancellation of removal, which “may” be granted by the
Attorney General); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2018) (providing that the Attorney General “may” adjust status of certain aliens within the United States); see also Patrick J. Glen, Matter of L-A-C-: A Pragmatic Approach to the Burden of Proof and
Corroborating Evidence in Asylum Proceedings, 35 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (noting numerous express and implied delegations to the Attorney General in the asylum statute); Patrick Glen, The Removability of Non-Citizen
Parents and the Best Interests of Citizen Children: How to Balance Competing
Imperatives in the Context of Removal Proceedings, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1,
13–20 (2012) (noting various additional waivers and forms of relief available in
the exercise of the Attorney General’s discretion).
See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987) (“There is obviously some
ambiguity in a term like ‘well-founded fear’ which can only be given concrete
meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication. In that process of filling
‘“any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,”’ the courts must respect the
interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility
for administering the statutory program.” (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984))).
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999).
Id. at 425 (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)).
Id. at 425–26.
Id. at 425.
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rule of last resort in post-Chevron cases. The Court has resolved many
cases on its own reading of the text using traditional tools of statutory
construction (but not the rule of lenity), as this section establishes,
and the Court has otherwise deferred to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, as a subsequent section
shows.197
The two main post-Chevron cases are INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca198
and INS v. St. Cyr.199 In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court had to resolve
which standard governs whether an applicant has established eligibility for asylum under the INA.200 The INA establishes two forms of
relief and protection for aliens who fear persecution in their country of
nationality. First, withholding of deportation (now called withholding
of removal) is a mandatory form of protection triggered where the
alien establishes that his “life or freedom would be threatened in” the
country of removal based on a statutorily protected ground, i.e., “race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”201 Second, asylum is a discretionary form of relief available to applicants who can establish past “persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of” a statutorily protected
ground.202 In an earlier case, the Supreme Court had already held
that to establish eligibility for withholding of deportation, the alien
had to demonstrate that “it is more likely than not that [he] would be
subject to persecution” in the country of removal.203 In reaching that
holding, the Court had rejected the applicant’s contention that the
“would be threatened” language of the withholding provision should
be governed by the looser “well-founded fear” standard that had developed under various statutory iterations pertaining to refugee
admissions.204
Cardoza-Fonseca presented the converse argument—should the
“more likely than not” standard developed for withholding cases govern the “well-founded fear” inquiry?205 The Government argued, in essence, “that the only way an applicant can demonstrate a ‘wellfounded fear of persecution’ is to prove a ‘clear probability of persecution.’”206 The Court rejected this argument for two main reasons.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See infra subsection IV.B.2.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421.
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982) (emphasis added) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)
(2018)).
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982) (emphasis added) (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018)); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982) (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b) (2018)).
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 (1984).
See id. at 428–30.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421.
Id. at 430.
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First, as a textual matter, “the language Congress used to describe the
two standards conveys very different meanings.”207 The “would be
threatened” language in the withholding provision pointed to an objective inquiry, whereas the asylum statute contemplated some level of
inquiry into the subjective mental state of the alien by requiring that
any fear be “well-founded.”208 And in common understanding, a fear
could be “well-founded” even “when there is less than a 50% chance of
the occurrence taking place.”209 Second, “[t]he message conveyed by
the plain language of the Act is confirmed by an examination of its
history.”210 Most importantly, in this regard, was the intent of the
drafters of the 1980 Refugee Act to “bring United States refugee law
into conformance with” its international obligations under the 1951
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol.211 The consistent interpretation and application of the Convention’s own definition of “refugee” indicated that an applicant may qualify where the evidence
establishes something significantly less than a “clear probability” of
persecution.212 And differential treatment of the two standards was
especially warranted based on the structure of international law,
which was mirrored in the domestic Act: asylum corresponds to the
discretionary relief contemplated by the Convention, whereas withholding of deportation corresponds to the mandatory non-refoulement
obligation, applicable where an applicant establishes a greater risk of
harm if removed.213
Resort to these traditional tools of statutory construction was sufficient to reject the Government’s argument that the two statutes
should be interpreted to provide for identical inquiries:
Our analysis of the plain language of the Act, its symmetry with the United
Nations Protocol, and its legislative history, lead inexorably to the conclusion
that to show a “well-founded fear of persecution,” an alien need not prove that
it is more likely than not that he or she will be persecuted in his or her home
country.214

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id. at 430–31.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 432–33.
See id. at 436–41.
Id. at 438–40.
Id. at 440–41; id. at 441 (“Article 34 provides for a precatory, or discretionary,
benefit for the entire class of persons who qualify as ‘refugees,’ whereas Article
33.1 provides an entitlement for the subcategory that ‘would be threatened’ with
persecution upon their return. This precise distinction between the broad class of
refugees and the subcategory entitled to § 243(h) relief is plainly revealed in the
1980 Act.” (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 (1984))).
214. Id. at 449.
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These “ordinary canons of statutory construction” were “compelling,
even without regard to the longstanding principle of construing any
lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien.”215
In contrast with the relatively easy disposition of Cardoza-Fonseca, INS v. St. Cyr presented two thorny questions related to the
massive statutory reforms enacted in 1996 by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA):216 whether habeas
jurisdiction had been repealed, and whether the repeal of relief available under former § 212(c) was retroactive as applied to aliens who pled
guilty to a qualifying offense prior to enactment.217 On the procedural
question of whether district courts retained jurisdiction to consider
questions of law in cases where the INA otherwise foreclosed jurisdiction via a petition for review, the Supreme Court answered in the
affirmative:
[T]he absence of [an alternative forum in which to raise the purported legal
question], coupled with the lack of a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of congressional intent to preclude judicial consideration on habeas of
such an important question of law, strongly counsels against adopting a construction that would raise serious constitutional questions.218

Having resolved the threshold jurisdictional issue, the Court proceeded to the merits question: whether the amendments to the relief
provisions made in 1996 foreclosed an alien’s ability to seek a certain
form of discretionary relief from removal when the conviction was entered prior to the effective date of IIRIRA.219 In 1996, St. Cyr had pled
guilty to selling a controlled substance under Connecticut state law,
by which he became removable and “eligible for a discretionary waiver
of that deportation under” former § 212(c) of the INA.220 He was
placed into removal proceedings after the effective date of IIRIRA, and
the agency declined to consider him for relief under § 212(c) based on
the statutory repeal of that section.221 In analyzing the merits question, the Supreme Court began on solid and accepted ground: “A stat215. Id. (citing INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966); Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120,
128 (1964); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
216. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
217. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
218. Id. at 314 (citing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660–61 (1996)); see generally
David M. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the Immigration and Nationality
Act: Habeas Corpus and the Coming of REAL ID (1996-2005), 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 75 (2006–2007) (reviewing the habeas question in historical context with a
view to post-St. Cyr legislative developments).
219. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314.
220. Id. at 293, 314–15; see Patrick Glen, Judulang v. Holder and the Future of 212(c)
Relief, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 6–15 (2012) (providing a historical overview of
§ 212(c) relief through the Supreme Court’s decision in St. Cyr).
221. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293.
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ute may not be applied retroactively . . . absent a clear indication from
Congress that it intended such a result.”222 This was a high standard,
and the “cases where this Court has found truly ‘retroactive’ effect adequately authorized by statute have involved statutory language that
was so clear that it could sustain only one interpretation.”223 Although the Government made various arguments relating to the language of IIRIRA and its legislative history, the Court declined to find
that this high standard was met.224 Rather, it noted:
The presumption against retroactive application of ambiguous statutory provisions, buttressed by “the longstanding principle of construing any lingering
ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien,” forecloses the conclusion that . . . “Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential
unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable
price to pay for the countervailing benefits.”225

On its face, St. Cyr seems to present a closer call regarding the
application of the immigration rule of lenity. The Court explicitly references it as “buttress[ing]” the other relevant canon of construction,
the presumption against retroactivity.226 But even here the rule is doing nothing despite the rhetorical turn in the Court’s opinion, and its
subsequent reference in another retroactivity case five years later
makes that point clear.227 At issue in Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales
was a different IIRIRA amendment, that to the INA’s reinstatement
provision.228 That amendment provided:
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States
illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an
order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date
and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and
may not apply for any relief under this chapter, and the alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.229

Fernandez-Vargas was ordered removed sometime in the 1970s but
illegally reentered in 1982 and remained in the United States continuously since that date.230 He subsequently married a United States citizen and sought to adjust his status, but this application triggered an
investigation that uncovered the prior order of removal, which the
government then reinstated and used to remove him.231 On petition
for review, Fernandez-Vargas argued that pre-1996 law governed his
222. Id. at 316; see id. at 315–16 (“[C]ongressional enactments . . . will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.”
(quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988))).
223. Id. at 316–17 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 328 n.4 (1997)).
224. Id. at 317–20.
225. Id. at 320 (citations omitted).
226. Id.
227. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006).
228. Id.
229. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2000) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2018)).
230. Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 35.
231. See id. at 35–36.
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claims, since he had illegally reentered long before 1996; under that
law, unlike IIRIRA’s reinstatement provision, he remained eligible for
adjustment of status.232 The Tenth Circuit rejected this claim, holding
that § 241(a)(5) barred any further relief, and that its application to
him did not have “an impermissible retroactive effect.”233
Before the Supreme Court, Fernandez-Vargas argued:
Congress intended that INA § 241(a)(5) would not apply to illegal reentrants
like him who returned to this country before the provision’s effective date; and
in any event, that application of the provision to such illegal reentrants would
have an impermissibly retroactive effect, to be avoided by applying the presumption against it.234

The Supreme Court began by noting its three-step sequential analysis
for retroactivity cases.235 First, the question is “ ‘whether Congress
has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach,’ and in the absence of language as helpful as that we try to draw a comparably firm
conclusion about the temporal reach specifically intended by applying
‘our normal rules of construction.’ ”236 Second, “[i]f that effort fails, we
ask whether applying the statute to the person objecting would have a
retroactive consequence in the disfavored sense of ‘affecting substantive rights, liabilities, or duties [on the basis] of conduct arising before
[its] enactment.’ ”237 Finally, “[i]f the answer [to that second question]
is yes,” the Court “then appl[ies] the presumption against retroactivity
by construing the statute as inapplicable to the event or act in question owing to the ‘absen[ce of] a clear indication from Congress that it
intended such a result.’ ”238
It was within this framework that Fernandez-Vargas sought to
raise the immigration rule of lenity. He contended that the rule should
be applied at step one of the retroactivity analysis: “Since the new law
is bereft of . . . clarity [regarding whether it applied to pre-enactment
activity],” Fernandez-Vargas argued that “we should apply the ‘longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien.’ ”239 The effect of doing that would
be to “impose ‘[t]he presumption against retroactive application of ambiguous statutory provisions,’ ” limiting the scope of § 241(a)(5)’s application to post-enactment reentries only.240 Applying the immigration
rule of lenity in this manner, at step one of the retroactivity analysis,
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 36.
Fernandez-Vargas v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 881, 886, 890–91 (10th Cir. 2005).
Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 38.
Id. at 37.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 278 (1994)) (citing Lindh
v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)).
238. Id. at 37–38 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316 (2001)) (citing Martin v.
Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 352 (1999)).
239. Id. at 40 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320).
240. Id. (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320).
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would render unnecessary the remaining two steps.241 Yet as the
Court noted, “[i]t is not until a statute is shown to have no firm provision about temporal reach but to produce a retroactive effect when
straightforwardly applied that the presumption [against retroactivity]
has its work to do.”242
Declining to apply the rule in the manner advocated by FernandezVargas, the Court concluded that “[c]ommon principles of statutory interpretation fail to unsettle the apparent application of § 241(a)(5) to
any reentrant present in the country, whatever the date of return.”243
This aspect was ultimately more or less beside the point, however, as
the Court held that, as applied to Fernandez-Vargas, there was no retroactive effect.244 It was his “choice to continue his illegal presence,
after illegal reentry and after the effective date of the new law, that
subjects him to the new and less generous legal regime, not a past act
that he is helpless to undo up to the moment the Government finds
him out.”245
The Court’s distillation of the retroactivity analysis in FernandezVargas puts to rest any claim that the rule of lenity played a role in
the Court’s earlier decision in St. Cyr. The rule cannot come into play
at the threshold to resolve any ambiguity in whether Congress has
clearly dictated the temporal application of a statute. But if the Court
gets to step three, the presumption against retroactive application
would itself take precedence and resolve the case in accord with how
the immigration rule of lenity would have resolved the case. In other
words, it is not possible that the rule had a freestanding application in
St. Cyr; the statute remained “ambiguous” in a relevant sense after
the first two steps of the retroactivity analysis, but that ambiguity
was resolved within the analysis itself by presuming only prospective
effect for the repeal of § 212(c) relief.246
The last significant invocation of the rule was in Kawashima v.
Holder.247 The Kawashimas, husband and wife, pled guilty respec241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id.
Id. (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280).
Id. at 41–42.
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 44.
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478 (2012). The rule was also cited in Dada v.
Mukasey, where the issue presented related to the interplay between the motion
to reopen mechanism and the discretionary relief of voluntary departure, which
allows an alien to depart the United States without accruing the legal disabilities
associated with “removal.” 554 U.S. 1 (2008). A failure to depart after having
been granted voluntary departure also entailed adverse legal consequences, but
departure while a motion to reopen was pending effected a withdrawal of that
motion. Id. at 15. The Court explained:
Without some means, consistent with the Act, to reconcile the two commands—one directing voluntary departure and the other directing ter-
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tively to violations of willfully making and subscribing a false tax return,248 and aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax
return.249 They were subsequently found removable as aliens convicted of an aggravated felony offense, as defined by § 1101(a)(43)(M):
“[A]n offense that either ‘(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss
to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or (ii) is described in section
7201 of title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which revenue loss to the
Government exceeds $10,000.’ ”250 Before the Supreme Court, the
Kawashimas argued that § 7206 offenses “do not involve ‘fraud or deceit,’” and that in any event all tax offenses are excluded by implication from subsection (i).251
The Supreme Court quickly rejected the first argument. “The language of Clause (i) is clear. Anyone who is convicted of an offense that
‘involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000’ has committed an aggravated felony and is subject to
deportation . . . .”252 Convictions under § 7206 met that definition, as
“[t]he elements of willfully making and subscribing a false corporate
tax return . . . and of aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false
tax return . . . establish that those crimes are deportable offenses because they necessarily entail deceit.”253 The second argument was an
argument by implication—that the express reference to tax evasion in
subsection (ii) was exhaustive of tax offenses, and that such offenses

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

mination of the motion to reopen if an alien departs the United States—
an alien who seeks reopening has two poor choices: The alien can remain
in the United States to ensure the motion to reopen remains pending,
while incurring statutory penalties for overstaying the voluntary departure date; or the alien can avoid penalties by prompt departure but
abandon the motion to reopen.
Id. at 5. Given the statutory language relating to motions to reopen, and the important procedural safeguard the reopening mechanism served, the Court found
“[i]t is necessary . . . to read the Act to preserve the alien’s right to pursue reopening while respecting the Government’s interest in the quid pro quo of the voluntary departure arrangement.” Id. at 19. This conclusion was rooted in “the plain
text of the statute” and the need to avoid the absurd result of foreclosing reopening for a favored class of aliens, those eligible for and granted voluntary departure. Id. at 18–19 (citing Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 127–28 (1964)). For this
final point, the rule of strict construction warranted a “see also” citation at the
end of a long string cite. Id. at 19 (citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320 (“[R]ecognizing
‘the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation
statutes in favor of the alien.’ ”); Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 399 (1995)). The rule
did not play any role in the Court’s adoption of its interpretation of the statute.
Id. at 4–23.
Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 480; see 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (2012) (current version at 26
U.S.C. § 7206(1) (2018)).
Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 480; see 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) (2012) (current version at 26
U.S.C. § 7206(2) (2018)).
See Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 481.
Id. at 482.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 484–85.
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were therefore outside the scope of subsection (i).254 The Court determined that there was nothing in the plain language of the statute to
support the exclusion of tax offenses from the broad scope of the language used by subsection (i)—an offense that “involves fraud or deceit.”255 And the possibility that a court would conclude that tax
evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 would not qualify as a “fraud or deceit”
crime under subparagraph (i) was a sufficient justification for the disparate treatment between that offense (given its own subsection) and
other tax-based offenses (which could fall under subsection (i)).256 The
Kawashimas also argued “that subparagraph (M)’s treatment of tax
crimes other than tax evasion is ambiguous, and that we should therefore construe the statute in their favor.”257 The Court rejected that
invitation: “We think the application of the present statute clear
enough that resort to the rule of lenity is not warranted.”258
This post-Chevron review of the rule’s application concludes in a
familiar way, by noting that there is no indication whatsoever in these
opinions that the rule was relevant to the decision. In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court explicitly noted it could and was resolving the case on
other grounds without the need to resort to the rule of strict construction. St. Cyr does raise the rule in a context where it seems like it is
relying on it at least in part, but the presumption against retroactive
application did the heavy lifting and left the rule of lenity with no
work to do. Application of the rule is rejected as unnecessary in both
Fernandez-Vargas, which clarifies the inappropriateness of applying
the rule within the retroactivity analysis, and Kawashima.
There is also no support in these cases for an argument that lenity
would displace Chevron or even have a role to play within the Chevron
framework. In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court construed the question of
whether the withholding and asylum standards were identical as “a
pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide.”259 It
accepted the applicability of deference to immigration decisions generally, but concluded that deference was not appropriate since resolution of the case did not call for any of the gap filling to which Chevron
would apply.260 Chevron was also found to be irrelevant in St. Cyr. As
the Court noted, “[b]ecause a statute that is ambiguous with respect to
retroactive application is construed under our precedent to be unambiguously prospective, there is, for Chevron purposes, no ambiguity in
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 485.
Id. at 486.
Id.
Id. at 489.
Id.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).
Id. at 448 (“[O]ur task today is much narrower, and is well within the province of
the Judiciary.”).
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such a statute for an agency to resolve.”261 The rule was additionally
noted in Dada v. Mukasey, but there the indication is that Chevron
would have work to do in cases of ambiguity and that the rule of lenity
would not serve as the tiebreaker. Even as the Court adopted a de
novo interpretation of the motion to reopen and voluntary departure
provisions as requiring a mechanism to permit withdrawal of the voluntary departure request, it opined that the agency would have authority to render a different interpretation and disagree with how the
Court had resolved the case.262
IV. CONTEXTUALIZING THE ROLE OF LENITY IN
IMMIGRATION CASES
This Part moves from doctrinal overview to normative questions:
How or why would lenity have a role to play in interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act in circumstances where the application of
administrative deference is otherwise required? Section A begins by
shifting focus to the rule of lenity in criminal cases. How and why that
rule has been applied, and its inherent limitations, are relevant to assessing whether a similar rule could play the same role in the context
of immigration cases. Section B returns to the immigration rule of lenity and the fundamental question: Even assuming some historical relevance for the rule, does it retain vitality in a world governed by
Chevron? The answer is no—its application is foreclosed by the nature
of the step one inquiry and incompatible with the step two inquiry,
while it is unclear that there remains space outside the Chevron
framework where the rule could find a home.
The final two sections address remaining questions. Section C confronts the question of whether lenity should displace deference in a
certain class of immigration cases, addressing provisions directly concerned with deportation, while allowing deference to apply to the remaining class of cases, e.g., interpretation of relief provisions. This
typological distinction makes little sense, however, because of the interconnected nature of the immigration laws. It also makes little sense
under Chevron’s framework, as the removability provisions are as
much a matter of agency expertise as any other facet of the immigration laws. The better rule is that which concludes section B: Chevron
governs review in immigration cases to the exclusion of lenity. Finally,
section D argues that the death of lenity will be of little moment, and
considering its general and uniform irrelevance to the decisions in
261. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 n.45 (2001) (citation omitted).
262. Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 20 (2008) (“Although a statute or regulation might
be adopted to resolve the dilemma in a different manner, as matters now stand
the appropriate way to reconcile the voluntary departure and motion to reopen
provisions is to allow an alien to withdraw the request for voluntary departure
before expiration of the departure period.”).
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which it has thus far been raised, it would seem difficult to seriously
contest that position. The Chevron framework ensures that aliens will
not be subject to arbitrary or capricious interpretations of the immigration laws, as such cases will be resolved either under the clear intent of Congress or a reasonable and permissible construction of the
statutory language by the agency. And, in hindsight, this framework
would have largely rendered the development of the rule of lenity unnecessary. In other words, if lenity has done work in the past, it can
safely cede that role to Chevron now.
A.

Strict Construction in Criminal Cases

The rule of strict construction of penal statutes, or the criminal
rule of lenity, is “[t]he judicial doctrine holding that a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the
more lenient punishment.”263 The rule originated “in the legislative
blood lust of eighteenth-century England. Faced with a vast and irrational proliferation of capital offenses, judges invented strict construction to stem the march to the gallows.”264 In 1883, Sir Peter Maxwell
wrote:
The rule which requires that penal and some other statutes shall be construed
strictly was more rigorously applied in former times, when the number of capital offences was very large; when it was still punishable with death to cut
down a cherry-tree in an orchard, or to be seen for a month in the company of
gipsies [sic] . . . .265

The rule survived the retrenchment of capital punishment and was
absorbed as a general rule of statutory construction to be applied in
specific circumstances. As early as 1820, Chief Justice Marshall paid
homage to the rule, writing:
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less
old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the
rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment
is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature,
not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.266

But criticism of the rule is nearly as old as the rule itself, and
many states acted to implement legislation that would disallow strict
263. Rule of Lenity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see DAVID MELLINKOFF,
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE 577 (1992) (describing the rule of lenity
and stating that “generally, ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in
favor of the defendant, e.g., a less harsh penalty”).
264. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 198 (1985).
265. SIR PETER BENSON MAXWELL, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 462 (W. Wyatt-Paine ed., Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd. & The Carswell Co. 6th ed. 1920) (1883).
266. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).
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construction of their penal codes.267 In more contemporary times, the
rule has seemingly fallen out of favor as a dispositive rule of decision.268 Talk of the rule’s prior glory colors the contemporary debate,
but assertions of its historical robustness seem misplaced or at least
based on spotty evidence.269 For instance, although Chief Justice Marshall described the long-standing nature of the rule, his description of
its application is not one of particular strength or vitality:
It is said, that notwithstanding [the rule of strict construction], the intention
of the law maker must govern in the construction of penal, as well as other
statutes. This is true. But this is not a new independent rule which subverts
the old. It is a modification of the ancient maxim, and amounts to this, that
though penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so
strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. The maxim is not
to be so applied as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases
which those words, in their ordinary acceptation, or in that sense in which the
legislature has obviously used them, would comprehend. The intention of the
legislature is to be collected from the words they employ. Where there is no
ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction.270

And for every example of the court “find[ing] ambiguity and adopt[ing]
a narrow construction even when it seemed illogical[ ], contrary to the
literal language of the statute[ ], or likely to frustrate the congressional purpose,”271 there are multiple examples of the Court noting
the inherent limitations of the rule and declining to adopt a narrower
267. See Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L.
REV. 748, 752–56 (1935); id. at 753 n.25 (“The distinction between a favourable
and unfavourable construction of laws is abolished. All penal laws whatever are
to be construed according to the plain import of their words, taken in their usual
sense, in connexion with the context, and with reference to the matter of which
they treat . . . . Courts are expressly prohibited from punishing any acts or omissions which are not forbidden by the plain import of the words of the law, under
the pretence that they are within its spirit.” (quoting EDWARD LIVINGSTON, SYSTEM OF PENAL LAW PREPARED FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 12 (Philadelphia, John
I. Kay & Co. 1872))); id. (“The rule of the common law that penal statutes are to
be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. All its provisions are to be
construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its
objects and to promote justice.” (quoting DAVID D. FIELD, WILLIAM C. NOYES &
ALEXANDER W. BRADFORD, DRAFT OF A PENAL CODE FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK
5 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1864))).
268. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 264, at 200 (“[S]trict construction may no longer
retain widespread allegiance in the courts . . . .”); Zachary Price, The Rule of
Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 885–86 (2004) (“[T]he rule
[of lenity] has lately fallen out of favor with both courts and commentators. . . .
[I]t appears occasionally as a supplemental justification for interpretations favored on other grounds . . . .”).
269. See, e.g., Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2421–23 (2006)
(describing a more robust rule of lenity that courts were quicker to apply in the
face of statutory language that could bear multiple reasonable interpretations,
but providing only three examples between 1820 and the 1970s of cases that
could be allegedly explained by a resort to lenity).
270. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 95–96.
271. Note, supra note 269, at 2423.
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construction of the statute even where that narrower construction
could be deemed plausible.272
The rule has never, then, been absolute or applied in a vacuum;
“whenever invoked it comes attended with qualifications and other
rules no less important.”273 As the Court opined in Hartwell:
The rule of strict construction is not violated by permitting the words of the
statute to have their full meaning, or the more extended of two meanings, as
the wider popular instead of the more narrow technical one; but the words
should be taken in such a sense, bent neither one way nor the other, as will
best manifest the legislative intent.274

The overarching focus of the courts in applying the rule of lenity, in
both the past and modern times, has thus been the intent of the legis272. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25–26 (1948) (rejecting narrower
construction, as “[t]he canon in favor of strict construction is not an inexorable
command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose. It does not
require magnified emphasis upon a single ambiguous word in order to give it a
meaning contradictory to the fair import of the whole remaining language”);
United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 530 (1944) (same, and noting that the
principle of strict construction “does not require distortion or nullification of the
evident meaning and purpose of the legislation” (citing United States v. Raynor,
302 U.S. 540, 552 (1938); United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 48 (1937); Gooch v.
United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936))); Raynor, 302 U.S. at 552 (“No rule of
construction . . . requires that a penal statute be strained and distorted in order
to exclude conduct clearly intended to be within its scope—nor does any rule require that the act be given the ‘narrowest meaning.’ It is sufficient if the words
are given their fair meaning in accord with the evident intent of Congress.” (citing Giles, 300 U.S. 41)); Giles, 300 U.S. at 48 (“The rule, often announced, that
criminal statutes must be strictly construed does not require that the words of an
enactment be given their narrowest meaning or that the lawmaker’s evident intent be disregarded.” (citing United States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233, 242 (1909)));
Gooch, 297 U.S. at 128 (“Congress intended to prevent transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of persons who were being unlawfully restrained in
order that the captor might secure some benefit to himself. And this is adequately
expressed by the words of the enactment. . . . [W]hile penal statutes are narrowly
construed, this does not require rejection of that sense of the words which best
harmonizes with the context and the end in view.” (citing United States v. Mescall, 215 U.S. 26, 31–32 (1909); United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 402 (1908);
Johnson v. S. Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1904); United States v. Hartwell, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 395 (1868))); Corbett, 215 U.S. at 242 (“But the argument is
that, however cogent may be the considerations [supporting conviction], they are
here inapplicable, because the statute is a criminal one, requiring to be strictly
construed. The principle is elementary, but the application here sought to be
made is a mistaken one. The rule of strict construction does not require that the
narrowest technical meaning be given to the words employed in a criminal statute, in disregard of their context, and in frustration of the obvious legislative
intent.” (citing Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 385)).
273. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 395.
274. Id. at 396 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Morris, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 464,
475 (1840); Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 96; United States v. Winn, 28 F. Cas.
733 (D. Mass. 1838) (No. 16,740)).
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lature.275 Nonetheless, as the focus on that intent has grown in contemporary times, the importance of the rule has receded:
[I]t has lost much of its force and importance in recent times, and it is now
recognised that the paramount duty of the judicial interpreter is to put upon
the language of the Legislature, honestly and faithfully, its plain and rational
meaning, and to promote its object.276

Under modern iterations of the rule, it “only applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute, such that the Court must
simply guess as to what Congress intended.”277 It is not sufficient to
find the statute less than clear or that a narrower construction is possible.278 Before the Court will consider resort to lenity, it must bring
275. E.g., Mescall, 215 U.S. at 32 (the defendant’s “act comes within the letter of the
statute as well as within its purpose; and the intent of Congress in the legislation
is the ultimate matter to be determined”); Johnson, 196 U.S. at 16–18 (rejecting
narrower construction adopted by the court of appeals as contrary to normal usage of the statutory language and incompatible with legislative intent); accord
Bitty, 208 U.S. at 401–03 (similar); Winn, 28 F. Cas. at 734 (“[W]here the words
are general, and include various classes of persons, I know of no authority, which
would justify the court in restricting them to one class, or in giving them the
narrowest interpretation, where the mischief to be redressed by the statute is
equally applicable to all of them. And where a word is used in a statute, which
has various known significations, I know of no rule, that requires the court to
adopt one in preference to another, simply because it is more restrained, if the
objects of the statute equally apply to the largest and broadest sense of the word.
In short, it appears to me, that the proper course in all these cases, is to search
out and follow the true intent of the legislature, and to adopt that sense of the
words, which harmonizes best with the context, and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.”); see also United States v.
Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 628 (1890) (“[T]hough penal laws are to be construed
strictly, yet the intention of the legislature must govern in the construction of
penal as well as other statutes; and they are not to be construed so strictly as to
defeat the obvious intention of the legislature.” (citing Morris, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at
464; Am. Fur Co. v. United States, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 358, 367 (1829); Wiltberger, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 76)); Morris, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 475 (“In expounding a penal
statute the Court certainly will not extend it beyond the plain meaning of its
words; for it has been long and well settled, that such statutes must be construed
strictly. Yet the evident intention of the legislature ought not to be defeated by a
forced and overstrict construction.” (citing Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 95));
Am. Fur Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 367 (“This construction of the acts of congress
which have been referred to, is, in the judgment of this Court, well warranted by
the words of those acts; as well as by the obvious policy which dictated them. . . .
Even penal laws, which, it is said, should be strictly construed, ought not to be
construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature.”).
276. MAXWELL, supra note 265, at 462–63.
277. United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 172–73 (2014) (quoting Barber v.
Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010)).
278. See, e.g., Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 188 n.10 (2014) (“The dissent
would apply the rule of lenity here because the statute’s text, taken alone, permits a narrower construction, but we have repeatedly emphasized that is not the
appropriate test.” (citing Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998);
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993))).
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all traditional interpretive tools to bear on the relevant statutory
phrase in order to try and ascertain its meaning.279 The rule of lenity
“comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what
Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.”280 And, as a tool ultimately
tied to legislative intent, the rule is not “a directive to this Court to
invent distinctions neither reflective of the policy behind congressional enactments nor intimated by the words used to implement the
legislative goal.”281
Deference-related issues are not generally present in the interpretation of pure criminal statutes. “A court owes no deference to the
prosecution’s interpretation of a criminal law,” since “[c]riminal statutes ‘are for the courts, not for the Government, to construe.’ ”282 To
the extent the question has arisen, it has done so in the context of an
“executive agency’s interpretation of a law that contemplates both
criminal and administrative enforcement.”283 Whether arising under
the securities, environmental, or labor law statutes, to name a few,
the courts of appeals have uniformly determined that deference is
warranted in such circumstances, and thus that the criminal rule of
lenity’s role is further cabined; ambiguity in such circumstances may
be resolved by a permissible agency interpretation, leaving lenity with
little or no role to play in such cases.284
The Supreme Court has not definitively resolved the question; it
has not foreclosed resort to deference prior to lenity nor endorsed lenity to the exclusion of deference. But its decisions seem to indicate
some role still for deference to play even in the context of the so-called
“dual-use statutes.”285 Confronting the EPA’s regulatory definition of
the term “take” under the Endangered Species Act, for instance, the
Court noted that “[t]he latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enforc279. See id. (“Although the text creates some ambiguity, the context, structure, history, and purpose resolve it.”); Barber, 560 U.S. at 488 (“Having so considered the
statute, we do not believe that there remains a ‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty’ in the statutory provision before us. Nor need we now simply ‘guess’ what
the statute means.”).
280. Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 76 (2013) (quoting Callanan v. United States,
364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961)).
281. United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 82 (1964).
282. Whitman v. United States, 574 U.S. 1003, 1003–04 (2014) (Scalia, J., respecting
the denial of cert.) (mem.) (quoting Abramski, 573 U.S. 169).
283. Id. at 1004.
284. See United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886, 899 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v.
Flores, 404 F.3d 320, 326–27 (5th Cir. 2005); NLRB v. Okla. Fixture Co., 332 F.3d
1284, 1286–87 (10th Cir. 2003); In re Sealed Case, 223 F.3d 775, 779 (D.C. Cir.
2000); United States v. Kanchanalak, 192 F.3d 1037, 1047, 1047 n.17 (D.C. Cir.
1999); NRA v. Brady, 914 F.2d 475, 479 n.3 (4th Cir. 1990).
285. See generally Patrick J. Glen & Kate E. Stillman, Chevron Deference or the Rule
of Lenity? Dual-Use Statutes and Judge Sutton’s Lonely Lament, 77 OHIO ST. L.J.
FURTHERMORE 129 (2016) (making this argument in the context of the INA).
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ing the statute, together with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement, establishes that we owe some degree of
deference to the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation.”286 In reaching
its decision, the Court rejected resort to lenity simply because the ESA
also provided for criminal penalties: “We have never suggested that
the rule of lenity should provide the standard for reviewing facial challenges to administrative regulations whenever the governing statute
authorizes criminal enforcement.”287 The opinion in Babbitt may be
weak support for a more general rule as to how lenity interacts with
deference. The decision “expressly limits itself to ‘facial challenges,’
the sorts of claims that raise arguments—say that the regulation exceeded the agency’s authority and thus was unenforceable in all of its
applications—that have no connection to the rule of lenity.”288 And
Justice Scalia previously described this language as a “drive-by ruling
. . . deserv[ing] little weight.”289 But the general principle is borne out
in other cases. In United States v. O’Hagan, for instance, the Court
applied deference canons to a legislative rule implemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission and concluded that the Commission’s assessment of that rule, and whether it “is reasonably designed
to prevent fraudulent acts,” must be accorded “controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”290 And the Court subsequently applied Skidmore deference to
the Secretary of Labor’s “views about the meaning of . . . enforcement
language” within the agency’s expertise,291 rejecting resort to the rule
of lenity after resolving the case on deference grounds. In fact, the
Court’s statement that “after engaging in traditional methods of statutory interpretation, we cannot find that the statute remains sufficiently ambiguous to warrant application of the rule of lenity here,”292
supports the argument that Chevron is such a tool to be applied prior
to resort to lenity.
286. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703–04
(1995).
287. Id. at 704 n.18.
288. Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1030 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev’d sub nom. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
289. Whitman v. United States, 574 U.S. 1003, 1005 (2014) (Scalia, J., respecting the
denial of cert.) (mem.).
290. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
291. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 14–15 (2011) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)); see id. at 15–16 (“These
agency views are reasonable. They are consistent with the Act. The length of time
the agencies have held them suggests that they reflect careful consideration, not
‘post hoc rationalizatio[n].’” (alteration in original) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983))).
292. Id. at 16.
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How or Why Would Lenity Fit Within the Deference
Framework?

The historical overview of both the immigration rule of lenity and
its much older relative, the criminal rule of lenity, is important to understanding how or why lenity should fit within the deference framework announced by the Supreme Court in Chevron. This section turns
to that focal question and proceeds in three subsections. First, is lenity
relevant at the first step of Chevron? Second, if not, does it come into
play at step two? And finally, if the answer is again no, does there
nonetheless exist a class of cases outside the scope of Chevron to which
the rule of lenity may have relevance? The answer to the first two
questions is a resounding “no.” The answer to the third is similarly a
“no,” with a potentially narrow qualification.
1.

Step One?

The purpose of Chevron’s step one is to ascertain whether Congress
has clearly spoken on the precise question at issue, and if it has, “that
is the end of the matter”: that plain meaning must control.293 Lenity,
on the other hand, operates in a world where there is some doubt or
ambiguity regarding the statutory language and legislative intent. It
makes no sense to reference lenity in the context of trying to find the
plain meaning of a statutory provision, and the function of applying
lenity at step one would more often than not frustrate the intent behind that inquiry. As David Rubenstein has argued, “one cannot fairly
say that the rule of lenity sheds light on Congress’s actual intent as to
any ‘precise question.’ Instead, lenity is a transmutable concept that
affords the most favorable interpretation to the alien in any given
case, whatever that may be.”294
The immigration rule of lenity’s poor fit at step one of the Chevron
framework tracks the similar irrelevance of the criminal rule of lenity
at the threshold of interpreting penal statutes. The inquiry then is
whether, taking the language together with traditional tools of statutory construction and giving the words their fair meaning, a more or
less plain meaning can be distilled.295 If application of those tools of
construction distill such a meaning, that interpretation controls even
if it is harsh and even if a more lenient construction of the statute
could be contemplated.296 In other words, the criminal rule does not
operate at the threshold as a directive to adopt the most lenient interpretation possible, and the legislative intent always must be the
293. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
294. David S. Rubenstein, Putting the Immigration Rule of Lenity in Its Proper Place:
A Tool of Last Resort After Chevron, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 479, 507 (2007).
295. See supra notes 272, 277–79 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 272.
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guide.297 Where that intent can be gleaned, either from the language
of the statute itself or from other relevant sources, the inquiry is at an
end.
This view of the immigration rule of lenity—as not operating at
step one to mitigate the otherwise harsh consequences, or limited
scope of relief, contemplated by Congress in enacting a provision—
finds additional support in Supreme Court precedent, as Rubenstein
explains.298 In Phinpathya v. INS, the Ninth Circuit held that an
alien could establish eligibility for suspension of deportation, which
required seven years of “continuous physical presence” in the United
States, despite her three month absence from the country during the
relevant statutory period.299 The court of appeals concluded that this
departure was not “meaningfully interruptive” of her presence, since
she always intended to return, and thus could not serve to foreclose
eligibility for relief.300 The Supreme Court reversed, finding the term
“continuous” plain and the Ninth Circuit’s contrary reading foreclosed
by this plain meaning.301 In reaching this holding, the Court rejected
the alien’s argument that, despite the plain language, the statute
should be construed more generously in line “with the equitable and
ameliorative nature of the suspension remedy.”302 The Court concluded that a liberal interpretation would conflict with the result Congress itself intended in enacting the statute,303 and that if Congress
wanted a less harsh relief provision, it was “up to [it] to temper the
laws’ rigidity if it so desires.”304 Until that time, the plain meaning of
the existing statute controlled, and that plain meaning foreclosed the
alien’s argument.305 In another case involving suspension of deporta297. See supra note 275; see also Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 76 (2013) (“In this
framework, there is no work for the rule of lenity to do.”); United States v. Healy,
376 U.S. 75, 82 (1964) (noting the rule of strict construction “is hardly a directive
to this Court to invent distinctions neither reflective of the policy behind congressional enactments nor intimated by the words used to implement the legislative
goal”).
298. Rubenstein, supra note 294, at 508–10.
299. See Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d 464 U.S.
183 (1984).
300. Id.
301. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 189–92.
302. Id. at 192.
303. See id. at 194 (noting that “[h]ere . . . we have every reason to believe that Congress considered the harsh consequences of its actions. . . . We would have to
ignore the clear congressional mandate and the plain meaning of the statute” to
accept the alien’s argument); id. at 195 (“It is . . . clear that Congress intended
strict threshold criteria to be met before the Attorney General could exercise his
discretion to suspend deportation proceedings. . . . Respondent’s suggestion that
we construe the Act to broaden the Attorney General’s discretion is fundamentally inconsistent with this intent.”).
304. Id. at 196.
305. Id.
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tion, which in addition to physical presence required a qualifying family relationship with a United States citizen spouse, parent, or child,
the Third Circuit had reversed an agency decision and remanded for it
to consider whether the alien’s relationship with her United States
citizen nieces was the functional equivalent of the parent–child relationship.306 The Supreme Court found the Third Circuit’s attempt to
inject a more liberal operation into the statutory scheme inappropriate: “[E]ven if Hector’s relationship with her nieces closely resembles
a parent-child relationship, we are constrained to hold that Congress,
through the plain language of the statute, precluded this functional
approach to defining the term ‘child.’ ”307
The immigration rule of lenity is not front and center in these
cases but lurks behind the façade of what the Court is actually doing.
As Rubenstein writes, “[w]hile the Supreme Court in Phinpathya and
Hector did not expressly refer to the immigration rule of lenity, the
Court did reject any notion that lenity has a role in statutory interpretation where the terms of the statute are clear.”308
Beyond the incoherence of applying a rule tied to ambiguity at the
level of trying to ascertain the plain meaning of a statute, there are
both jurisprudential and structural concerns that would also argue
against its use at this stage. First, lenity could be applied at step one
only if it had attained a sufficient status to be classed with the “clear
statement rules” that the Supreme Court has applied at step one.309
But the immigration rule of lenity does not have such an exalted pedigree; it is a recently introduced rule of construction that is at best a
tiebreaker in narrow circumstances, not a rule “deeply rooted in our
jurisprudence, and embod[ying] a legal doctrine centuries older than
our Republic.”310 Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has not treated
the rule as in a class with the other “clear statement” canons. It relied
on traditional canons in Cardoza-Fonseca while noting that resort to
those canons was sufficient without reference to lenity, indicating that
lenity did not occupy comparable ground in the interpretive analysis.311 Likewise, Fernandez-Vargas rejected resort to lenity as incompatible with the structure the Court had already established to assess
retroactivity and impermissible retroactive effect.312 And in any
event, the rule of lenity would be an ill fit with the other clear state306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

INS v. Hector, 479 U.S. 85, 87–88 (1986).
Id. at 90 (citing Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 194).
Rubenstein, supra note 294, at 510.
Id. at 505.
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316 (2001) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)); see also Rubenstein, supra note 294, at 506 (contrasting “the immigration rule of lenity”
with the “presumption against retroactivity”).
311. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987).
312. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 40–42 (2006).
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ment rules, which tend to serve the purpose, at least ostensibly, of
elucidating congressional intent or at least the legal backdrop against
which Congress is assumed to be legislating.313 The immigration rule
of lenity does no such thing; it is irrelevant to ascertaining the intent
of Congress and serves only to resolve ambiguity once that intent cannot be found from the language or other accepted tools of statutory
construction.
Second, applying lenity at step one would entail unacceptable
structural consequences for the deference framework. If lenity applied
at step one to resolve the meaning of the statute, there would never be
a reason to proceed to step two in an immigration case. Rather, once
any ambiguity was found, the rule would immediately apply to resolve
that ambiguity in favor of the alien, leaving no room or reason for the
court to then assess the reasonableness or permissibility of the
agency’s own interpretation. Applied at step one, the immigration rule
of lenity would eviscerate the Chevron framework for all immigration
cases.
2.

Step Two?

Step two of Chevron, concerned as it is with resolving ambiguity,
provides on first blush a more comfortable fit for the immigration rule
of lenity. Is it possible that lenity is applicable at step two, and if so,
how is it to be applied? Reviewing the case law and literature, Rubenstein posited at least two ways in which lenity could be applied at step
two: as a rule that the agency would be required to apply itself in interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions, or, on petition for review
before the courts of appeals, as a “litmus test for reasonableness.”314
There are, however, at least two problems with applying the rule in
this fashion. Neither application fits with the statement of deference
and limited review required at Chevron step two, and neither fits actual Supreme Court practice in immigration cases presenting step two
issues.
First, the Court has made clear in numerous cases that the question at step two is not whether the agency had adopted the interpretation a court deems “best” or the interpretation that the court itself
313. See, e.g., McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991) (“It is
presumable that Congress legislates with knowledge of our basic rules of statutory construction . . . .” (citing Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476
U.S. 667, 670 (1986))); see also King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220 n.9
(1991) (stating that the Court “will presume congressional understanding of . . .
interpretive principles” (citing McNary, 498 U.S. at 496)). See generally Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109,
159–63 (2010) (describing these background assumptions in greater detail).
314. Rubenstein, supra note 294, at 510–17.
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would prefer.315 Rather, the question is whether the interpretation
adopted by the agency is a permissible and reasonable construction of
the statute in light of all relevant considerations.316 Adopting lenity at
step two would eliminate the agency discretion inherent in the delegations by Congress by dictating the interpretation that must follow
once any ambiguity or gap is found. This contradicts decades, if not
centuries, of Supreme Court precedent that establishes that an agency
is not required to select a specific interpretation against a competing
plausible interpretation of the statute; it must only select an interpretation that is reasonable.317 Using lenity as a “litmus test” before the
courts of appeals ostensibly provides more discretion, if the point is
that lenity will be a relevant factor when reviewing the agency determination but not alone determinative of the reasonableness of that
interpretation. But even in this context, it is not clear why, if two interpretations are equally plausible, and equally permissible and reasonable, lenity should place a thumb on the scale of one rather than
the other. For the agency as well as the reviewing courts, the question
should be only whether the interpretation adopted is reasonable. If it
is, that ends the inquiry at step two. There should not be a further
inquiry into whether, even if the agency’s interpretation is reasonable,
a more lenient interpretation was possible and thus possibly required.
Whether as a consideration for the agency or the reviewing court, applying the rule at step two would eviscerate the Chevron framework in
a similar way as its application at step one. There would never be any
room for agency interpretation, as once ambiguity was found, any
doubts regarding the proper construction would be resolved in favor of
the more lenient interpretation.
Second, application of lenity at step two is, at best, in tension with
Supreme Court practice, and, at worst, contrary to that practice. The
Supreme Court has consistently deferred to agency interpretations of
the INA at step two without regard to whether a more lenient or permissive interpretation of the statute was possible. In Aguirre-Aguirre,
the Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision for failure to give appropriate deference to the agency’s construction of the serious nonpolitical crime bar to withholding of deportation.318 According to the
Supreme Court, the court of appeals had, in concluding that the Board
had to “supplement” its interpretation of the statute “by examining
additional factors,” “failed to accord the required level of deference to
315. See, e.g., Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583, 591 (2012) (stating that the
Board’s “position prevails if it is a reasonable construction of the statute, whether
or not it is the only possible interpretation or even the one a court might think
best” (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999); Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44, 843 n.11 (1984))).
316. See id.
317. See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text.
318. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425–32.
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the interpretation of the serious nonpolitical crime exception adopted
by the Attorney General and BIA.”319 In Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez,
the Supreme Court upheld the Board’s interpretation of the cancellation of removal statute as not requiring that a parent’s continuous
physical presence be imputed to a minor child for purposes of establishing statutory eligibility for relief.320 In doing so, it rejected a contrary Ninth Circuit decision that had concluded such imputation was
required, at least in part because of the “canon of construction that
resolves ambiguities in favor of the alien.”321 The Ninth Circuit
opined that in rejecting the Board’s contrary interpretation and “allowing imputation, we merely implement the countervailing and coequal congressional policy of recognizing that presence in the United
States of an extended length gives rise to such strong ties to the
United States that removal would result in undue hardship.”322 Contrary to the court of appeals, however, the Supreme Court found the
Board’s interpretation reasonable and permissible, and thus the end
of the matter for interpretive purposes.323 Finally, in Scialabba v. de
Osorio, the Court upheld a strict agency interpretation of the retention and automatic conversion provisions enacted into the familybased visa preference system in order to safeguard “child” beneficiaries who turned twenty-one after the visa application was filed but
before the visa became “available.”324 In so holding, the Court rejected
the alien’s argument that “the BIA acted unreasonably in choosing the
more restrictive reading” of the statute.325 The plurality noted that
the Board’s interpretation was recommended by “administrative simplicity,” and that the agency had “offered a cogent argument, reflecting statutory purposes, for distinguishing between aged-out
beneficiaries” in different preference categories.326 In the view of Justice Kagan, de Osorio was “the kind of case Chevron was built for.
Whatever Congress might have meant . . . it failed to speak clearly.
Confronted with a self-contradictory, ambiguous provision in a complex statutory scheme, the Board chose a textually reasonable con319. Id. at 424.
320. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583.
321. Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987); Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824,
840 (9th Cir. 2003)).
322. Id.
323. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. at 598 (“Because the Board’s rejection of imputation
under § 1229b(a) is ‘based on a permissible construction of the statute,’ we reverse the Ninth Circuit’s judgments . . . .” (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984))).
324. Scialabba v. de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41 (2014).
325. Id. at 73.
326. Id. at 73–74 (citing Xiuyi Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. 28, 38 (BIA June 16, 2009)).
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struction consonant with its view of the purposes and policies
underlying immigration law.”327
Beyond merits cases, the rule is also inconsistent with Supreme
Court practice in cases where that Court has remanded to the Board
for it to exercise its interpretive authority. For instance, in Gonzales v.
Thomas, the Court summarily reversed a Ninth Circuit decision and
remanded proceedings to the agency for it to consider “in the first instance” the alien’s late-raised claim that her family “constitute[d] a
‘particular social group’ ” for purposes of asylum eligibility.328 Subsequently, in Negusie v. Holder, the Court remanded for the agency to
determine in the first instance whether there is a coercion or voluntariness exception to application of the persecutor bar to asylum and
withholding-of-removal eligibility.329 Both of these cases apply a version of the “ordinary remand rule,” the principle that “[g]enerally
speaking, a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for
decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands.”330
In Negusie, the Court explicitly supported its remand decision with
reference to the deference applicable to agency interpretations of statutes they are charged with administering: the “remand rule exists, in
part, because ‘ambiguities in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction
to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion. Filling these gaps . . . involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make than
courts.’”331 If lenity applied at step two, however, there would not be
any meaningful reason to remand. The appropriate interpretation,
i.e., the most lenient, could and should be imposed and applied by the
Court in the first instance.
3.

Relevance “Outside” Chevron?

Lenity is not compatible with Chevron deference. But does that
mean it has no place in the interpretation of immigration law? Ruben327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at 75.
Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 185 (2006) (per curiam).
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 523–24 (2009).
INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 18 (2002) (per curiam); see Patrick J. Glen, “To
Remand, or Not to Remand”: Ventura’s Ordinary Remand Rule and the Evolving
Jurisprudence of Futility, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 1, 4–19 (2010) (providing
historical development of the rule, with special emphasis on its application in
immigration cases).
331. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 554 (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)); id. at 524 (“The agency’s interpretation
of the statutory meaning of ‘persecution’ may be explained by a more comprehensive definition, one designed to elaborate on the term in anticipation of a wide
range of potential conduct; and that expanded definition in turn may be influenced by how practical, or impractical, the standard would be in terms of its application to specific cases. These matters may have relevance in determining
whether its statutory interpretation is a permissible one.”).
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stein thought not: “While the rule of lenity has no place within Chevron’s two-step framework, a role for lenity exists beyond Chevron—
after the court determinates that: (1) the statute is ambiguous; and (2)
the agency’s interpretation is unreasonable.”332 For Rubenstein, such
a role is consistent with Chevron, since it comes into play only if the
agency’s interpretation is not reasonable or permissible, and with the
concept of lenity itself, which is meant to come into play “only as a
doctrine of ‘last resort.’ ”333 Rubenstein’s choice of case to illustrate his
theory was, however, unfortunate—the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Cuevas-Gaspar, which the Supreme Court subsequently and unanimously reversed, holding that the Board’s contrary interpretation was
entitled to deference as a permissible construction of the statute.334
This point aside, two others bear mentioning. First, it is not clear
that lenity has a role to play even if the court finds that the agency’s
interpretation is unreasonable. If the statute is ambiguous and there
is no plain meaning to apply, the agency has the authority to interpret
the provision. If it has done so in an unreasonable manner, that error
should be flagged for the agency by the reviewing court and proceedings remanded so the agency can consider the issue anew apprised of
its prior error.335 In other words, the traditional “ordinary remand
rule” discussed above undercuts the notion that the immigration rule
of lenity has work to do if the agency’s interpretation is unreasonable.
Rather than apply lenity, the case should return to the agency for it to
correct its errors and reach a permissible construction of the statute.
Second, even assuming lenity could fill this role, it is not clear that
the court’s decision would be anything but a place-holder interpretation that the agency would not be bound to adopt itself. If the court of
appeals applies lenity after concluding that the agency’s interpretation is not reasonable, then it is applying its own construction to an
ambiguous statutory phrase. The Supreme Court has held, however,
that “[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an
agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if
the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
332.
333.
334.
335.

Rubenstein, supra note 294, at 517.
Id. at 518–19.
See supra notes 321–24 and accompanying text.
Negusie, 555 U.S. at 523–24; see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)
(“When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple but fundamental rule of
administrative law. That rule is to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing
with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds
invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is
powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to
be a more adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the
domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.”).
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discretion.”336 Thus, even were the court to adopt a more lenient construction in the circumstances contemplated by Rubenstein, nothing
binds the agency to that construction in a subsequent case. Rather, it
is free to render its own interpretation of the relevant provision subject to the normal strictures of Chevron, that its interpretation be reasonable and permissible.
The “beyond Chevron” rubric contemplated by Rubenstein thus inevitably comes back to Chevron. The court of appeals, concluding that
the agency interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision is unreasonable, should either remand for a new interpretation or render a
decision applying lenity but subject to agency “reversal” under Brand
X. In either case, the question will again boil down to the permissibility of the new interpretation under Chevron.
Although Rubenstein’s specific conception may not work, there
could be a narrower beyond-Chevron space where lenity might yet
come into play. Under the criminal rule of lenity, the rule is triggered
only in cases of “grievous ambiguity,” where even after considering all
relevant tools of statutory construction the court is left only to “guess
as to what Congress intended.”337 Perhaps lenity may be relevant in
such cases where ambiguity admits of no truly reasonable harmonization upon consideration of all relevant canons of construction and policy options. As Chief Justice Roberts noted in his concurrence in de
Osorio, “[d]irect conflict is not ambiguity, and the resolution of such a
conflict is not statutory construction but legislative choice. Chevron is
not a license for an agency to repair a statute that does not make
sense.”338 This would be a small selection of cases, attributable to
near-absolute incoherent draftsmanship on the part of Congress. And
it would also be subjective as to what qualified as a sufficiently direct
conflict to move the case outside the scope of Chevron. Returning to de
Osorio, Justice Kagan’s opinion for the plurality deferred to a statute
it described as “Janus-faced,” each of the relevant provision’s two
clauses pointing in a separate direction.339 “Read either most naturally, and the other appears to mean not what it says. That internal
tension makes possible alternative reasonable constructions, bringing
into correspondence in one way or another the section’s different
parts.”340 In the plurality’s view, “when that is so, Chevron dictates
336. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982; see id. at 982–83 (“Only a judicial precedent holding
that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency
construction.”).
337. United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 172–73 (2014) (quoting Barber v.
Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010)).
338. Scialabba v. de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 76 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the
judgment).
339. Id. at 57 (plurality opinion).
340. Id.
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that a court defer to the agency’s choice—here, to the Board’s expert
judgment about which interpretation fits best with, and makes most
sense of, the statutory scheme.”341
Nonetheless, leaving aside the question of what level of conflict
pushes a case outside the purview of Chevron, it is possible to conceive
the immigration rule of lenity as having some role to play in deciding
that class of case. But in such circumstances, there is no conflict with
deference principles anyway. A conflict sufficiently grievous to trigger
the rule of lenity presupposes a case where a reasonable interpretation of the statute is not possible, and so no displacement of agency
discretion is occasioned by applying lenity. Even without a conflict between lenity and deference, a court would be free to adopt an interpretation it thought most fair to the language used and the intent evinced
by Congress, without necessarily adopting the narrowest construction
of the statute.342 And it bears mentioning that if the statutory provision in de Osorio did not present such a case, even as it engendered
four separate opinions each resolving the case on different grounds, it
seems unlikely that there would be many, if any, circumstances where
the rule of lenity would be used for resolving cases.343
C.

Typological Distinctions and Lenity

If Chevron deference should generally displace lenity as an interpretive tool, is there nonetheless room to argue that this presumption
should be reversed for certain classes of cases? For instance, could deportation provisions be dealt with differently than other immigration
provisions, such that lenity may be a relevant consideration in the former category but not the latter? Versions of this argument have been
raised. In Torres, the alien argued that the immigration rule of lenity
“does not apply in all immigration cases; it applies only where deportation would be a consequence. In other immigration matters, the BIA
is entitled to deference when it reasonably interprets ambiguities in
the INA.”344 This argument seeks to take a middle ground, recognizing the applicability of Chevron to immigration cases (thus avoiding
the absurdity of arguing against Supreme Court practice), while nonetheless contending that deference is not warranted where the immediate consequence of the provision being interpreted is removal from the
United States. Cabining lenity in this fashion may have intuitive appeal, but it is nonetheless problematic for at least two reasons.
First, the foundation of deference to the agency’s interpretation of
the immigration laws is Congress’s express provision that the Attor341.
342.
343.
344.

Id.
See supra notes 272, 275.
de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 46.
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ney General’s ruling on “all questions of law shall be controlling.”345
There is no basis for parsing the plain text of this provision and concluding that it is controlling for most determinations under the immigration laws but not controlling as to certain other determinations.
This is especially true where the inadmissibility and deportation
grounds are at the very heart of the INA and the system established
by that statute. Carving them out of the class of interpretations that
would be entitled to deference on review makes little structural sense.
Disentangling deportation and inadmissibility grounds from other
provisions would also be close to impossible, considering that many of
the grounds of removability double as eligibility criteria.346 If lenity
dictated one interpretation for purposes of deportation and another for
345. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2018); see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415,
424–25 (1999) (noting the importance of this provision for purposes of determining whether deference is warranted).
346. Taking only the cancellation of removal provisions, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, there are no
less than nine subsections where eligibility for relief turns in some way on admissibility or deportability under sections 1182 and 1227. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a)(3) (2018) (“The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an
alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien— . . .
(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C)
(“The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or
deportable from the United States if the alien— . . . (C) has not been convicted of
an offense under section 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of this title . . . .”); 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iv) (“The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and
adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an
alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien demonstrates that— . . . (iv) the alien is not inadmissible under paragraph (2) or (3) of
section 1182(a) of this title, is not deportable under paragraphs (1)(G) or (2)
through (4) of section 1227(a) of this title, . . . and has not been convicted of an
aggravated felony.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c) (“The provisions of subsections (a) and
(b)(1) shall not apply to any of the following aliens: . . . (4) An alien who is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3) of this title or deportable under section
1227(a)(4) of this title.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(B) (“For purposes of this section,
any period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the United
States shall be deemed to end . . . (B) when the alien has committed an offense
referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the alien inadmissible to
the United States under section 1182(a)(2) of this title or removable from the
United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title . . . .”); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2018) (“No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person
of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is
required to be established is, or was— . . . (3) a member of one or more of the
classes of persons, whether inadmissible or not, described in paragraphs (2)(D),
(6)(E), and (10)(A) of section 1182(a) of this title; or subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
section 1182(a)(2) of this title and subparagraph (C) thereof of such section . . . (8)
one who at any time has been convicted of an aggravated felony (as defined in
subsection [1101](a)(43)); or (9) one who at any time has engaged in conduct described in section 1182(a)(3)(E) of this title (relating to assistance in Nazi persecution, participation in genocide, or commission of acts of torture or extrajudicial
killings) or 1182(a)(2)(G) of this title (relating to severe violations of religious
freedom).”); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B) (requiring “good moral character” for non-
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purposes of relief, there would be statutory anarchy, which is to say
nothing about the impermissibility of bipartite interpretations of single terms or provisions of a statute.347 But if the default then became
“lenity controls,” deference over large swaths of the INA would be
eliminated, including over many or most relief provisions; the cabined
version of lenity could quickly result in the wholesale importation of
the concept. Finally, there is a conceptual disconnect between the
cabined version of lenity and reality—in removal and relief cases, the
same stakes are at issue. Interpretation of the removal provision may
more immediately affect (in the sense of directly controlling) the
alien’s removability, but interpretation and application of the INA’s
relief and protection provisions has the same consequence. Denial of
relief or protection from removal entails removal. In other words, the
distinction between deportation as such, and the relief and protection
provisions of the INA, is less significant than first meets the eye.
Second, Supreme Court practice does not support the distinction.
Although the rule is phrased in terms of strict construction of deportation statutes,348 the use of the term “deportation” seems more like a
shorthand for “immigration.” Before Chevron, lenity was mentioned in
cases presenting both issues of deportability and relief, and there was
no difference in how the rule was stated or applied.349 After Chevron,
too, it has been mentioned in both classes of cases with no distinction
as to its applicability, i.e., that it would be applicable in the deportation context but not in the relief context.350 If there is in fact an immigration rule of lenity with substantive content, it would seemingly

347.

348.

349.

350.

permanent resident cancellation of removal); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iii) (same,
for special-rule cancellation of removal).
See, e.g., Clark v. Suarez Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005) (“To give these same
words [in the same statute] a different meaning for each category would be to
invent a statute rather than interpret one. . . . [The statute may be reasonably
interpreted in at least two ways, but] [i]t cannot . . . be interpreted [in both ways]
at the same time.”); cf. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (“Although
here we deal with § 16 in the deportation context, § 16 is a criminal statute, and
it has both criminal and noncriminal applications. Because we must interpret the
statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies.” (citing United States v. Thompson/
Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517–18 (1992) (plurality opinion))).
See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (describing the rule as
“the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien” (citing INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966);
Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 128 (1964); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10
(1948))).
Compare Costello, 376 U.S. 120 (relating to deportability of the alien), and Fong
Haw Tan, 333 U.S. 6 (same), with Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (relating to eligibility for a
waiver of deportability).
Compare Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478 (2012) (deportability), with
Scialabba v. de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41 (2014) (visa eligibility), and Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 (2012) (cancellation of removal).
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apply to the immigration laws writ large—the INA as a whole—and
not only to specific portions thereof. There is no warrant for a more
specific targeting of subparts of the INA for lenity while otherwise employing deference principles. Lenity and deference present all-or-nothing propositions, and it is lenity that should come out the loser in that
contest.
D.

The Unnecessity of Lenity

The Supreme Court, given the appropriate case, should “bury”351
the immigration rule of lenity, rather than allow it to continue to
“stalk” the Court’s immigration jurisprudence.352 The rule has always
been irrelevant to the decisions the Court issued, but its rationale was
on some level supported by a semblance of conceptual sense: in cases
of statutory ambiguity where the Court needed a tiebreaker, the rule
of lenity provided additional cover for adopting one interpretation of
the immigration laws rather than another. The criminal rule of lenity
survives in some form today because it continues to serve that same
purpose in the context of a court’s interpretation of penal statutes. In
contrast, the immigration rule of lenity is an anachronism whose conceptual underpinnings were demolished with Chevron’s advent.353
The role previously served by the rule, at least rhetorically, has now
been delegated to the Attorney General acting through his delegates.
Will the rule’s funeral mark a change in the Supreme Court’s immigration jurisprudence? Of course not; there is no colorable argument that cases will be decided any differently than they have been in
the nearly four decades since Chevron was decided. In no decision decided in that timeframe did the rule provide even a relevant component of the Court’s decision in an immigration case, let alone the
actual dispositive basis for decision. And that reality charts the longer
history of the rule, where it was never dispositive and at best a light
thumb on the scales for an interpretation around which a majority
had otherwise coalesced. As an unnecessary rule of decision in the last
four decades, it is highly unlikely to have any effect in future cases.
This is especially true where the purposes of lenity can be adequately realized within the Chevron framework. The immigration rule
351. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 8.
352. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and
buried, [the] Lemon [test] stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once
again, frightening the little children . . . .”).
353. Cf. Whitman v. United States, 574 U.S. 1003, 1004 (2014) (Scalia, J., respecting
the denial of cert.) (mem.) (“Undoubtedly Congress may make it a crime to violate
a regulation, but it is quite a different matter for Congress to give agencies—let
alone for us to presume that Congress gave agencies—power to resolve ambiguities in criminal legislation.” (citations omitted)).
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of lenity was premised in part on the harshness of deportation,354 but
even accepting that framing, the harshness was not itself the raison
d’être of the rule. Lenity was not required at the threshold to allow an
alien to avoid deportation simply because the statute could contemplate a lenient interpretation, just as the criminal rule of lenity is not
applied at the beginning as a tool for mitigating application of the penal laws.355 The immigration rule of lenity, like the similar criminal
rule, was meant to ensure that the courts did not stray into territory
that was the province of the legislative branch.356 It would not contemplate deportation in circumstances where it was not clear that
Congress would have intended, with the statutory provision it enacted, that result.357 Chevron changes the scope of the territory the
courts should be respecting; once it may have been solely the prerogative of Congress acting through legislation to establish discrete and
specific criteria to govern all immigration questions, but that is no
longer true today and has not been for decades. Immigration law is a
collaborative work between the legislative and executive branches,
with the judiciary playing referee. The framing of the immigration
rule of lenity as trying to protect against arbitrary determinations regarding deportation can still serve as a guide on judicial review, but
deference does alter the scope of a court’s authority to consider that
factor. This concern, however, can be adequately considered within
the existing Chevron framework.
At step one of Chevron, courts can simply take a harder look at the
statutory language in conjunction with other relevant tools of statutory construction to distill a plain meaning of the statute. As Justice
Kennedy bemoaned in Pereira, “some Courts of Appeals [have] engaged in cursory analysis of the questions whether, applying the ordinary tools of statutory construction, Congress’ intent could be
discerned.”358 Eschewing such “reflexive deference” would propel the
courts into a deeper review of relevant materials, thus minimizing the
need to defer to agency interpretations while ensuring that most cases
354. See, e.g., Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947) (“Deportation can be
the equivalent of banishment or exile . . . . We will not attribute to Congress a
purpose to make his right to remain here dependent on circumstances so fortuitous and capricious as those upon which the Immigration Service has here
seized.”).
355. See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (“[S]ince the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on
his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible
meanings of the words used.”); see also Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 75–76
(2013) (finding “there is no work for the rule of lenity to do” in interpreting the
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994).
356. See supra note 275 (regarding the criminal rule of lenity).
357. See Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10; Delgadillo, 332 U.S. at 391.
358. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, n.9 (1984)).

2021]

THE IMMIGRATION RULE OF LENITY

591

are resolved on “plain meaning” grounds, i.e., grounds that arguably
better track the legislative intent (or at least legislative text). The
Court’s decision in Pereira itself cannot be explained on other grounds;
as Justice Alito accurately noted in his solo dissent, the majority’s decision effectively imposed a better reading on the statute in derogation
of basic principles of deference.359 The decision in Esquivel-Quintana
v. Sessions is also on par; the Court effectively concluded that the term
“sexual abuse of a minor” is clear enough regarding certain applications, i.e., in not encompassing statutory rape offenses in states where
the age of majority is sixteen or seventeen, but potentially still ambiguous on other applications, including statutes with the same age of
consent but that also include elements evincing a power dynamic between the victim and abuser.360 As the Court explicitly noted in that
case, resolving the question on that basis allowed it to avoid any question of how deference or lenity should apply.361
Consideration of Pereira and Esquivel-Quintana should not give
one too rosy a view as to how a harder look may benefit aliens. The
interpretations adopted in both cases did ultimately benefit the alien
seeking to avoid removal, but it is just as likely that the plain meaning
of the statute will foreclose relief or support deportation. That is the
result the Court came to in both Torres and Kawashima, upholding
interpretations of the INA’s aggravated felony provision that entailed
the deportation of the petitioners in those cases.362 It is also the conclusion the Court reached more recently in Barton v. Barr, upholding
a strict interpretation of the cancellation-of-removal provision’s stoptime rule,363 as well as the earlier cases, Phinpathya and Hector.364
To be sure, then, a harder look is not a benefit to one party or the
other. But neither the alien nor the government have any claim to a
359. Id. at 2121 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Here, a straightforward application of Chevron
requires us to accept the Government’s construction of the provision at issue. But
the Court rejects the Government’s interpretation in favor of one that it regards
as the best reading of the statute. I can only conclude that the Court, for
whatever reason, is simply ignoring Chevron.”).
360. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1572 (2017) (“Absent some special relationship of trust, consensual sexual conduct involving a younger partner
who is at least 16 years of age does not qualify as sexual abuse of a minor under
the INA, regardless of the age differential between the two participants. We leave
for another day whether the generic offense requires a particular age differential
between the victim and the perpetrator, and whether the generic offense encompasses sexual intercourse involving victims over the age of 16 that is abusive
because of the nature of the relationship between the participants.”).
361. Id. (“We have no need to resolve whether the rule of lenity or Chevron receives
priority in this case because the statute, read in context, unambiguously forecloses the Board’s interpretation.”).
362. See Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016); Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478
(2012).
363. See Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020).
364. See supra notes 298–307 and accompanying text.
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more lenient (or stricter) interpretation that would be in derogation of
the plain meaning of the statute, established by resort to traditional
tools of statutory construction.365 The only point is that under Chevron’s existing framework, and undertaking the more searching review
of plain meaning advocated by Justice Kennedy, the “purpose” of lenity would be served, as the alien would only be deportable or ineligible
for relief on the ground that Congress intended that exact result.
Step two of Chevron ultimately provides a similar safeguard, rejecting interpretations that are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
If the agency has rendered such an interpretation, then the proper
course is for the reviewing court to vacate the decision and remand.
The Supreme Court took this tack in Judulang v. Holder, overturning
agency precedent for assessing a deportable alien’s eligibility for relief
under former § 212(c) of the INA.366 There, the Court concluded that
“[b]y hinging a deportable alien’s eligibility for discretionary relief on
the chance correspondence between statutory categories—a matter irrelevant to the alien’s fitness to reside in this country—the BIA has
failed to exercise its discretion in a reasoned manner.”367 And in Mellouli v. Lynch, the Court rejected deference, holding that the Board’s
interpretation of the relevant removability provision made “scant
sense.”368 As already noted, the Court made a similar move in
Negusie, holding that the Board had improperly deemed itself bound
by Supreme Court precedent in construing the persecutor bar, finding
that the Board had not interpreted the statute for that reason, and
remanding for further proceedings.369
Again, reasonableness will ensure that aliens are not removed or
denied relief on spurious grounds. And in retrospect, this would have
been sufficient to forestall any rhetorical resort to lenity in the foundational cases. In Degladillo, for instance, it would have been easy to
construe an agency interpretation of “entry” as encompassing an involuntary shipwreck and temporary stay in the country of rescue as
arbitrary and capricious. Whatever other interpretive discretion the
agency could have in construing that term, that would not be a reasonable reading entitled to deference. Likewise, in Fong Haw Tan, an interpretation of the twice-sentenced language as encompassing only a
single indictment and sentencing would not have passed muster under
Chevron. There may still have been some leeway for the agency to interpret the term contrary to the Court’s holding in Fong Haw Tan—for
instance, in accord with the Fourth Circuit’s holding that the statute
required distinct criminal occurrences and separate sentences for
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011).
Id. at 53.
Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1989 (2015).
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 522–24 (2009).
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each, but not necessarily a second sentencing hearing. But that would
not have changed the Court’s rejection of the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
In the end, the reasonableness requirement of Chevron tempers the
limits of agency discretion in construing the immigration laws, permitting only those interpretations that are reasonable. This is an adequate safeguard against the harshness of deportation.
V. CONCLUSION
The immigration rule of lenity should be interred as a vestige of a
bygone era, irrelevant to contemporary judicial review of immigration
law. Rooted in shaky jurisprudential grounds and always a bridesmaid, never a bride, insofar as resolving cases has been concerned,
any relevance for the rule disappeared in 1984 with Chevron. Rather
than continue to countenance the rule’s ghoulish existence, stalking
argumentation before the Supreme Court, the Court should simply
put to rest what seems firmly established on a clear-eyed review of the
rule’s history: the rule is a myth, a rhetorical device turned to in order
to support interpretations otherwise firmly rooted in application of
traditional tools of statutory construction. Instead of the paeans that
advocates have grown used to periodically paying, the rule deserves
only an elegy.

